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INTRODUCTION

A private tragedy was played out for a national and international audience earlier this year when it seemed as if every media outlet in operation
brought us nearly non-stop coverage of the life and death struggle of Theresa
Marie Schiavo. 1 Ms. Schiavo died on March 31, 2005, but the controversy that
2
surrounded her is likely to live on. There is much that could be written about
Ms. Schiavo's situation, ranging from the role of religion in end-of-life matters
to the fundamental question about how society should deal with the wishes of
citizens concerning the time and manner of their death. This Article deals with
another aspect of the matter, the federal intervention in this end-of-life drama.
Whatever one might believe about the wisdom of that intervention, there is no
question that it provides a rare opportunity to consider some fundamental issues
concerning the American constitutional order. What is the extent of Congressional authority under the Constitution to confer jurisdiction on the federal
courts? What obligation does Congress have, if any, to "respect" state court
judgments? May Congress specify the manner in which a federal court is to
exercise its jurisdiction? In sum, the strange interaction of Congress and Terri
Schiavo allows one to consider issues that go to the core of the system of government established under the Constitution.
In this Article, I consider these issues both in the context of the specific
law Congress passed concerning Ms. Schiavo as well as more broadly. I argue
that the statute Congress passed allowing federal court intervention in the
Schiavo end-of-life drama might have been unwise, but it was constitutional.
Moreover, I ultimately suggest that a consideration of Congressional action concerning Ms. Schiavo can tell one a great deal about the structures of government
in the United States and the power entrusted to the federal government under the
Constitution.
There were literally thousands of media stories about Terri Schiavo during the month of her
death, March 2005. For example, a search on the LEXIS/NEXIS "news and business" database
for March 2005 using the word "Schiavo" yields over 3000 results. Attention came from everything from international newspapers, see, e.g., Editorial, No place for politics in right-to-diecase,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 23, 2005, at 12, to prominent American media outlets, see, e.g.,
Editorial, A Blow to the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005, at A22; Laura Parker et al., Does
Congress seek due process or politicalgain?, USA -TODAY, Mar. 21, 2005, at IA, to local papers,
see, e.g., Carl Hulse, Basic rights, due process, politics mingle, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Mar. 19,
2005, at 1; Opinion, Critical Condition; Schiavo law puts Constitution on life support, THE
RECORD, Mar. 22, 2005, at L14.
2
See Manuel Roig-Franzia, Long Legal Battle Over as Schiavo Dies, WASH. POST, April 1,

2005, at Al (reporting on Ms. Schiavo's death).
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No matter how one looks at the situation, what Ms. Schiavo and her
family endured was tragic. Most people who watched any television or read any
newspapers in the first part of 2005 are aware of the basic facts of the Schiavo
saga. 3 For present purposes it suffices that in 1990, twenty-seven year old Terri
Schiavo lost consciousness for unknown reasons and, as a result, her brain was
deprived of oxygen for several minutes.4 For several years, Terri's husband
(Michael Schiavo), who was appointed her guardian under Florida law, and her
parents (Bob and Mary Schindler) were united in their approach to Terri's
medical treatment. 5 Eventually, however, dissention engulfed the family. 6 Michael Schiavo, as Terri's guardian, requested that a Florida state court decide
whether his wife would have wished to continue receiving nutrition and hydration in her then-current condition, which had been diagnosed as a persistent
vegetative state.7
Amazingly contentious litigation followed Michael Schiavo's petition.
Applying well-established Florida constitutional and statutory law, every court
to consider the issue ruled both that Terri Schiavo was in a persistent vegetative
state and that she would not have wished to continue receiving artificial nutri-

3

There are several sources that provide more detailed discussions of the facts surrounding the
Schiavo litigation than that set forth in this Article. See, e.g., Michael P. Allen, The Constitution
at the Threshold of Life and Death: A Suggested Approach to Accommodate an Interest in Life
and a Right to Die, 53 AM. U. L. REv. 971, 976-77, 1009-11 (2004); Michael P. Allen, Life, Death
andAdvocacy: Rules of Procedurein the Contested End-of-Life Case, 34 STETSON L. REv. 55, 6680 (2004); Kathy L. Cerminara, Tracking the Storm: The Far-Reaching Power of the Forces
Propelling the Schiavo Case, 35 STETSON L. REV. (forthcoming 2005); Joan Didion, The Case of
Theresa Schiavo, 52 THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS (June 9, 2005); 0. Carter Snead, Dynamic
Complementarity: Terri's Law and Separation of Powers Principles in the End-of-Life Context,
57 FLA. L. REv. 53, 55-69 (2005). In addition, the University of Miami Medical School has an
excellent website containing a timeline of the Terri Schiavo matter along with links to many primary source documents. See Kathy Cerminara & Kenneth Goodman, Key Events in the Case of
Theresa
Marie
Schiavo,
http://www.miami.edu/ethics2/Schiavo/timeline.htm
ethics2/Schiavo/timeline.htm (last visited June 27, 2005).
4
See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. App. 2001). At the time
of this decision, everyone involved worked under the assumption that Ms. Schiavo "suffered a
cardiac arrest as a result of a potassium imbalance." Id. An autopsy indicated that, in fact, Ms.
Schiavo had not suffered a cardiac arrest. See Report of Autopsy of Theresa Marie Schiavo (June
13, 2005), available at http://www.miami.edu/ethics2/ Schiavo/061505-autopsy.pdf. The cause
of Ms. Schiavo' s 1990 collapse remains unknown.
5
See Report of Jay Wolfson, Guardian Ad Litem at 11 (Dec. 1, 2003), available at
www.miami.edu/ethics2/ Schiavo/wolfson%27s%20report.pdf
[hereinafter Wolfson Report].
Professor Wolfson had been appointed Ms. Schiavo's guardian ad litem under the terms of
"Terri's Law," FLA. STAT. § 744.3215(1) (2005). Id. at 1. That statute was eventually declared
unconstitutional under the Florida Constitution. See Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004).
See also infra notes 11-14 (further discussing Terri's Law).
6
See Wolfson Report, supra note 5, at 12.
7
In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d at 177.
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tion and hydration given that fact. 8 After years of litigation (including one
countermanded order directing the removal of the feeding tube9), Ms. Schiavo's
feeding tube was removed pursuant to a court order on October 15, 2003.10 In a
preview of what would happen later on the national level, matters then took a
remarkable turn when the Florida Legislature enacted what popularly became
known as "Terri's Law."'" Under
Terri's Law, the feeding tube was reinserted
12
and additional litigation began.
It was clear to many observers from the very start that Terri's Law was14
unconstitutional 13 and the Florida Supreme Court so held in Bush v. Schiavo.
After the Florida high court's decision, the process began again to carry out
See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 851 So. 2d 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); In re
Guardianship of Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); In re Guardianship of
Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176.
9
See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 792 So. 2d at 561-62.
10 CNN, Woman's Feeding Tube Removed, Oct. 16, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW
8

/10/15/coma.woman/index.html.
II Terri's Law was codified as FLA. STAT. § 744.3215 (2004). See also Adam C. Smith, Gov.
Bush's Order Puts Schiavo Back on Fluids, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 22, 2003, at 1A (discussing the circumstances of the bill's passage).
12
Florida's version of Terri's Law was a brazen attempt by Florida's Legislature and Governor to reverse the rulings of Florida's judicial branch concerning Terri Schiavo's end-of-life
wishes. The law granted Governor Jeb Bush unfettered discretion to "stay" a court order directing
the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration from a patient if the patient had no advance directive, a
court had found the patient to be in a persistent vegetative state, nutrition and hydration had, in
fact, been withheld from the patient, and a member of the patient's family had challenged that
withdrawal. See FLA. STAT. § 744.3215(1). The Governor's authority under the act expired fifteen days after the act became a law, but any stays he issued remained in place. § 744.3215(2).
The Legislature and the Governor were successful in their efforts. After the passage of the law,
Governor Bush immediately issued a "stay" of the court order in place and Terri Schiavo's feeding tube was reinserted. See Fla. Gov. Exec. Order No. 03-201 (Oct. 21, 2003), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/schiavo/flagovexordO3201.html; Smith, supra note 11.
13
See, e.g., Michael P. Allen, Terri's Law and Democracy, 35 STETSON L. REV. (forthcoming
2005); Barbara A. Noah, Politicizing the End of Life, 59 U. MIAMI L. REv. 107, 114-26 (2004);
but see Thomas C. Marks, Jr., A Dissenting Opinion, Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (2004), 35
STETSON L. REv. (forthcoming 2005) (suggesting grounds upon which the Florida Supreme Court
could have upheld Terri's Law); Snead, supra note 3 (arguing that Terri's Law was constitutional).
14 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2003). The Florida Supreme Court held that Terri's Law was unconstitutional under the Florida Constitution's explicit guarantee of separation of powers. Id. First, the
court concluded that the law was a legislative encroachment on the judicial branch. Id. at 329-32.
Second, it held that Terri's Law amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to
the executive branch. Id. at 332-36. The Florida Supreme Court declined to reach other arguments that Terri's Law was unconstitutional, in particular those concerning the act's effect on
Terri Schiavo's right to refuse medical treatment under the Florida Constitution. See id. The
lower court had based its decision declaring the law unconstitutional on such personal liberty
grounds as well as separation of powers. See Schiavo v. Bush, No. 03-008212-CI-20, 2004 WL
980028 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 5, 2004). For a comprehensive consideration of Terri's Law and the
decision in Bush v. Schiavo, see Symposium, Reflections on and Implications of Schiavo, 35
STETSON L. REv. (forthcoming 2005).
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Terri Schiavo's end-of-life wishes as they had been determined in the state
courts. The culmination of these events was yet another court order, affirmed
on appeal, directing that Ms. Schiavo's feeding tube be removed, this time on
March 18, 2005.15 That order was carried out and the feeding tube was, once
again, removed from Ms. Schiavo's body.1 6 But then matters took yet another
unexpected turn, one that in many respects made the Florida Legislature's interference seem ordinary, as Congress and President Bush became fully involved
in the matter.
This Article focuses on that federal intervention, passage of Public Law
109-3, "An Act for the relief of the parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo. ' 1 7 In
brief, the Act created a means by which Ms. Schiavo's parents could seek federal court review of whether their daughter's federal constitutional or statutory
rights had been violated as a result of the Florida courts' orders concerning the
withdrawal of nutrition and hydration.' 8 The Act applied only to Ms. Schiavo's
parents. In addition to establishing federal jurisdiction, it also removed various
procedural barriers that might otherwise have precluded any federal review of
the matter (other than by the United States Supreme Court).' 9
Ms. Schiavo's parents commenced a federal lawsuit under the Act,
which eventually led to two opinions of a district judge in the Middle District of
Florida,2 ° two panel opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit,21 five opinions concurring in or dissenting from two separate

See In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 3574 (Fla. Ct. App. Mar. 16,
2005).
16
See John-Thor Dahlburg and Richard Simon, Schiavo Taken Off Food Supply, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 19, 2005, at Al. Congressional interference with Terri Schiavo's death actually began here,
before the passage of the Act that is the principal subject of this Article. Two Congressional
committees issued subpoenas designed to derail the implementation of the withdrawal of the feeding tube. See id.; Adam Liptak, With Schiavo Subpoenas, Lawmakers Leap Into Contested Territory, N.Y. TmEs, Mar. 19, 2005, at A12. The Florida trial judge presiding over the guardianship
case ruled that these subpoenas were without effect. See Norman Omstein, Opportunism Run
Amok: Congress and The Schiavo Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2005. The Congressional Committees thereafter unsuccessfully sought to overturn that order, an effort that ended when the United
States Supreme Court rejected a request to enjoin the lower court's rejection of the subpoenas.
Comm. on Gov't Reform of the U. S. House of Representatives v. Schiavo, 125 S.Ct. 1622
(2005). The use of Congressional committee subpoenas is a complicated one deserving of study.
It is, however, beyond the scope of this Article.
17
Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005) (the full text is included as an appendix to this Article). I often refer to it in this Article as the "Act."
18
Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 1. I discuss the Act's terms in greater detail below. See infra Part I.
19 Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 2.
20
Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (M.D. Fla. 2005); Schiavo ex
15

rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
21
Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005); Schiavo ex rel.
Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223 (11 th Cir. 2005).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2005

5

West Virginia
LawVIRGINIA
Review, Vol.
108,REVIEW
Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 4
LAW
WEST

[Vol. 108

refusals to grant en banc review at the circuit court level, and two denials of
requests for a stay or other extraordinary relief by the United States Supreme
Court.23 Amazingly, all of this activity occurred within the span of nine days.2 4
No one involved in the struggle was satisfied with the result. Many saw the Act
as unwarranted federal interference in a deeply personal matter. Thus, the process was seen as illegitimate from the start. For those in favor of the Congressional action, the dissatisfaction arose from the "failure" of the federal courts to
"save" Terri Schiavo by ordering the reinsertion of the feeding tube. And underlying all of this activity were the profound constitutional questions going to the
25
very heart of the American constitutional form of government the Act raised.
Before turning to those constitutional matters, it is important to recognize that the Act also clearly raises important questions of public policy. As a
policy matter, it seems fair to say that the Congressional interference in the Terri
Schiavo situation was not only unprecedented but also unwarranted. After all,
there had been over eight years of litigation in both state and federal courts concerning Ms. Schiavo's end-of-life wishes.26 One could be forgiven for believing
that the national government had more pressing matters with which to deal in
March 2005 than the end-of-life wishes of one person when there had already
been such intense litigation. Moreover, the federal intervention appeared to be
founded largely on a combination of political opportunism and political cowardice instead of rational policy determinations. The political opportunism came
largely from those on the right of the political spectrum who seized on the issue
as a means to divert attention from other unwelcome matters, such as grand jury
22

See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270 (11 th Cir. 2005) (in which Circuit

Judges Carmes and Hull wrote a joint concurrence, Circuit Judge Birth submitted his own concurrence, and Circuit Judge Tjoflat wrote a dissent in which Circuit Judge Wilson concurred);
Schiavo ex rel. Schindler, 403 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2005) (in which Circuits Judges Tjoflat and
Wilson each submitted opinions dissenting from rehearing en banc).
23 Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 125 S. Ct. 1722 (2005); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v.
Schiavo, 125 S.Ct. 1692 (2005).
24
The Act became law on March 21, 2005 and the last action by the Supreme Court was on
March 30, 2005. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler, 125 S. Ct. 1722.
25
In the days following the passage of the Act, several prominent academic commentators
recognized the myriad complex constitutional issues that were at play. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf,
How the Schiavo Federal Court Case Might Have Been Won, FINDLAW, Mar. 26, 2005,
http://writ.news.findlaw.comldorf/20050326.html (discussing potential constitutional issues);
David L. Hudson, Jr., Schiavo Case Prompts Constitutional Questions, ABA JOURNAL EREPORT,
Mar. 25, 2005, http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/m25schiavo.html (quoting various constitutional law professors concerning constitutional issues); Edward Lazarus, Why Congress's Inter2005,
vention Predictably Didn't Help the Schindlers, FINDLAW, Mar. 31,
http://writ.news.findlaw.comflazarus/ 20050331.html (briefly mentioning come potential constitutional concerns).
26
See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 3574, at *1 n.1 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2005) (listing reported decisions concerning Terri Schiavo in state and federal
courts through the date of the opinion). In addition, Ms. Schiavo's situation received yet another
full review through the investigation performed by guardian ad litem Jay Wolfson under the terms
of the later invalidated Florida Terri's Law. See Wolfson Report, supra note 5.
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investigations, or to advance broader political goals, such as restrictions on
abortion rights or assent to higher office.2 7 Political cowardice came largely
from the left. Very few people were willing to take a stand against the political
grandstanding, apparently fearing reprisals at the polls. 28 The ultimate result
was federal interference29 in a basic, personal decision, something that seems
quite difficult to justify.
But the question of the constitutionality of Congressional action concerning Terri Schiavo is a distinct matter. 30 The potential constitutional difficul27

Similar sentiments were also evident in the media. See, e.g., Laura Parker et al., Does Con-

gress Seek Due Process or PoliticalGain?, USA TODAY, Mar. 21, 2005, at lA ("The activity in
Congress reflects how the Schiavo case has become an emotional cause for anti-abortion conservatives who regard it as part of a broader effort to sustain life."); A Nod for States' Rights,
HERALD-SUN, Mar. 22, 2005, at A8 ("We will reserve judgment on the morality of removing
Terri's feeding tube. But we will say that we find all the grandstanding by conservatives on this
sensitive and deeply personal matter offensive. And the general silence by the majority of Democrats has been equally disappointing"); Ross K. Baker, Congress' Actions Not Sustained by
Constitution, NEWSDAY, Mar. 23, 2005 at A35 ("By succumbing to the hysteria over the Schiavo
case that was fanned by Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, in the interests of his presidential ambitions, and House Majority Leader Tom DeLay, in the interests of diverting public attention from
his ethical lapses, both houses of Congress intruded into the sacredness of a family's private
grief."); No Placefor Politics in Right-to-Die Case, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 23, 2005, at
12 ("The case provides an opportunity for the Republicans to pander to religious conservatives - a
strong source of support in last year's presidential election.").
28
Ironically, that political calculation seemed to misread the public's mood. Polling showed
that the overwhelming majority of Americans disapproved of Congressional interference in the
Schiavo matter. See, e.g., PollingReport.com, http://pollingreport.com/news.htm (last visited May
19, 2005) (listing numerous polls in which all demographic components of the U.S. population
surveyed opposed federal intervention in the Schiavo matter).
29
One could also rightly be critical of the manner in which Congress legislated. Congress
convened on a Sunday in special session to pass the legislation. There were no hearings on the
bill, which had only been introduced earlier that day. See "Bill Summary and Status" for Public
Law
109-03,
http://thomas.loc.giv?cvi-bin/bdquery/z?d 109:SN00686: @ @@XjTOM:/bss/
dl09query.html (last visited May 24, 2005). Only three senators were present when the measure
passed that body by voice vote on Sunday afternoon. See Gwyneth K. Shaw, Lawmakers Send
Schiavo Case on to U.S. Court, BALT. SUN, Mar. 21, 2005, at IA. The House passed the bill in an
extraordinary session lasting past midnight. See id. And then the President signed the bill after
"cut[ting] short a stay at his Texas ranch and rac[ing] back to the White House." See William
Neikirk, House Argues Schiavo Bill; In late-Night Session, Lawmakers Debate Intervention in
Florida case, Cm. TRIB., Mar. 21, 2005, at 1. In short, the passage of Public Law 109-03 is not
the way in which many citizens would hope or expect their government to form policy. See generally George J. Annas, "I Want to Live": Medicine Betrayed in the Political Battle Over Terri
Schiavo, 35 STETSON L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (critically discussing passage of Public Law
109-03).
30
The lower federal courts assumed the Act was constitutional for purposes of the litigation
Ms. Schiavo's parents filed. See, e.g., Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1227
(1 th Cir. 2005); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d, 1378, 1382-83 (M.D. Fla.
2005). But see Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2005), 2005 U.S.
App. LEXIS 5073 at *2 (Birch, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) (concluding that the
Act is unconstitutional). I discuss the salient points of Judge Birch's opinion below. See generally infra Part II.
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ties with the Act fall into three broad categories. 3' First, the Act raises important questions concerning the power of the federal government versus that of the
several states, a federalism-based objection. Second, the "procedures" the federal courts are to follow as set forth in Act raise a separation of powers concern
regarding the proper allocation of authority between Congress and the federal
judiciary. Finally, the Act raises concerns regarding the power of Congress
concerning the individual liberties of the People. While I will mention individual liberties from time to time, the principal focus of this piece is the structural
separation of powers and federalism-based objections.
As I discuss in depth below, while the answer to the structural constitutional queries is by no means clear, I ultimately conclude that what Congress did
may have been unwise, but it was not unconstitutional. Indeed, Congressional
action in the Schiavo saga, however misguided, ultimately serves as an example
of how the American constitutional structure - involving state and national authorities and the coordinate branches of the federal government - can operate
under the plan devised several hundred years ago. 32 A review of this Congressional action ultimately yields four overarching lessons.3 3 First, the Constitution
allows for wide-ranging oversight of state court decisionmaking, at least with
respect to matters arising under the Constitution and other federal law. Second,
Congress has broad authority under the Constitution with respect to the federal
courts. That authority includes both the power to prescribe the courts' jurisdiction as well as to control the manner of judicial decisionmaking. Third, while
Congress has such broad authority concerning the federal courts, its power is not
absolute. Congress may not intrude on the core function of the judiciary - to
adjudicate cases - nor may it arrogate to itself such an adjudicatory role. And
finally, taken in its totality, the Constitution provides a broad array of means by
which Congress can legislate ranging from the purely substantive invocation of
its Article I powers to the more subtle use of its powers in connection with Article II1 courts. That span of power yields many possibilities for Congressional
action in areas far beyond Terri Schiavo.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I lays out in some detail what
Congress did (and by implication, did not do) in the Act. It is not possible to
consider the constitutional issues seriously without this initial statutory work.
Part II identifies, describes and ultimately rejects the potential federalism and
separation of powers-based constitutional challenges to the Act. Part 11I pulls
back from a consideration of the Act itself to discuss the broader lessons about
the scope of federal power in our constitutional order that may be drawn from
Congressional involvement in Terri Schiavo's life and death. Finally, Part IV
31

I discuss the federal constitutional issues in detail below. See infra Part II.

32

I am not suggesting here that the Framers intended to have the system operate in a certain

manner. Rather, I assert that they created a system in which it is permissible for Congress to have
acted as it did in connection with Ms. Schiavo. See also infra note 124 (further discussing the
Framers' intent).
33 I discuss these lessons in more detail below. See infra Part III.
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provides some concluding thoughts concerning the fragility of the American
constitutional structure of government, even when it works as intended.
I. THE SUBSTANTIVE CONTOURS OF THE ACT

Congressional action in the Schiavo matter was widely reported and
discussed in the media. 34 That reporting included discussions of the Act's constitutionality but it often was not tethered closely to the Act's language. Instead,
there were broad statements concerning the Act's derogation of general principles of federalism, separation of powers, or individual rights. 35 Such generalized criticism might be useful as a rhetorical matter, but it does little to deal with
the weighty constitutional issues at play. This section of the Article reviews the
Act's text, as well as court decisions interpreting it, to establish its scope.
Thereafter, Part II surveys and ultimately rejects the potential structural constitutional objections to the Act.

For example, a search of the LEXIS/NEXIS news database for Monday March 21, 2005 (the
day on which the Act became law shortly after midnight) for stories containing the words
"Schiavo" and "Congress" yields over 350 results.
35 See, e.g., An Abuse of Federal Power, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Mar. 22, 2005, at
B6 (asserting that passage of the Act "goes against all principles of respect for states' rights and
an independent judiciary" and that "[i]t was an abuse of congressional power to direct further,
federal review of' the Schiavo case); Congress Oversteps; Schiavo Feeding-Tube Case Belongs
Not in Capitol but in Florida Court, NEWSDAY, Mar. 22, 2005, at A36 ("Our problem is not with
lawmakers' discomfort over the state court's order, which would lead inexorably to Schiavo's
death, but with Congress' outrageous leap over the boundaries that separate state powers from
federal ones."); A Blow to the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005, at A22 ("The new law
tramples on the principle that this is 'a nation of laws, not of men,' and it guts the power of the
states. When the commotion over this one tragic woman is over, Congress and the president will
have done real damage to the founders' careful plan for American democracy."); Critical Condition; Schiavo Law Puts Constitution on Life Support, THE RECORD, Mar. 22, 2005, at L14 ("The
House and Senate worked feverishly over the weekend and the president cut short his vacation to
create a law that violates fundamental principles of our government. It tramples on the separation
between the legislative and judicial branches, and it ignores the limits on federal power to intrude
in state matters."). A similar approach was taken by several academic commentators. See, e.g.,
William Allen, Erring Too Faron the Side of Life: Deja Vu All Over Again in the Schiavo Saga,
35 STETsON L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (describing the Act as "blatantly unconstitutional");
Lawrence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2D 291, 299 (Spring 2005) [hereinafter
Treatise] (characterizing the Act as pushing aside "deeply-settled rule-of-law, separation-ofpowers, and federalism principles").
34
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The Act is a narrowly drawn piece of legislation.3 6 While it was certainly passed hurriedly, substantial thought appears to have gone into its drafting. 37 At its core, the Act is a grant of subject matter jurisdiction to the federal
courts as to certain issues "arising under" the Constitution or laws of the United
States.38 Specifically, it grants jurisdiction with respect to claims "under the
Constitution or laws of the United States related to the withholding or withso granted is
drawal of food, fluids, or medical treatment., 39 But the jurisdiction
40
limited only to a suit brought by a parent of Terri Schiavo.
There are two critical things that the Act does not do. First, it does not
create any substantive law. 4 1 Any claim that might be filed would, therefore, be
decided under preexisting doctrine and precedent. Second, the Act does not
instruct the district court as to the ultimate outcome of any litigation Ms.

The Act was not the only piece of Congressional legislation considered in connection with
the Schiavo drama. Some of that other legislation was sweeping in its potential application. For
example, legislation was introduced in and passed by the House of Representatives that would
have allowed the removal of any case from state to federal court in which any state court had
ordered or allowed the withholding of nutrition, hydration or medical treatment from an incapacitated person. See The Protection of Incapacitated Persons Act of 2005, H.R. 1332, 109th Cong.,
(2005), availableat http://thomas.loc.gov. Whatever else one might say about the Act, there is no
doubt that H.R. 1332 would have had a far more dramatic effect on end-of-life issues in the
United States, including but not limited to a potential reallocation of a great many end-of-life
cases from the states to the federal court system.
37 The same cannot be said of some other proposed federal legislation. For example, Florida
Senator Mel Martinez introduced a bill in the Senate entitled the Incapacitated Persons Legal
Protection Act of 2005. See S. 539, 109th Cong. (2005), available at http://thomas.loc.gov. The
basic thrust of this proposal would have amended the federal habeas corpus statute in such a way
that Ms. Schiavo's parents would have been able to seek such a writ in federal court on their
daughter's behalf. See S.539 § 3. The parents had actually attempted to do so under existing law,
but their case had been dismissed. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Greer, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4182 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2005). Senator Martinez's proposal, however, was not particularly wellconsidered. While it sought to amend the relevant federal statutes to allow the parents to bring a
claim, it did nothing to alter the substantive law of habeas corpus. Id. And that law, enacted by
many of the same Republican legislators now pushing federal action to "save" Terri Schiavo,
greatly restricted the ability of the federal courts to grant the writ with respect to state court decisions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000) (limiting authority of court to grant writ). See also Erwin
36

Chemerinsky, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 872-73 (4th ed. Aspen 2003) (discussing limitations on

federal habeas review of state court conviction brought about by the 1996 enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act); infra note 170 (discussing certain aspects of current
habeas law). Needless to say, the situation is filled with irony.
38
See Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-03, § 1, 119 Stat. 15
(2005).
39 Id. See also Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F.Supp. 2d 1378, 1382 (M.D. Fla.
2005) (describing jurisdictional operation of the Act).
40
Pub. L. No. 109-03, §§ 1-2. The jurisdiction is also limited in that any suit under the Act
could only be brought in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Pub.
L. No. 109-03, § 1.
Pub. L. No. 109-03, § 5.
41
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Schiavo's parents should file.42 Indeed, the Act expressly states that the jurisdiction conferred on the district court is "to hear, determine, and render judgment" of a proper claim. 43 Thus, the Act is best read to leave to the judiciary the
power to "say what the law is" by applying existing law to Terri Schiavo's
situation. 44
But the Act certainly does dictate some important things about the manner in which the district court is to resolve any claim. First, the Act eliminates
certain threshold barriers that might have prevented Ms. Schiavo's parents from
proceeding with any litigation under the Act, even with its jurisdictional grant.
Specifically, it expressly: (1) purports to grant "standing" to Ms. Schiavo's parents to bring a claim; (2) instructs the district court not to abstain from deciding
any case that the parents might bring, and (3) relieves the parents of any obligation that might have existed to exhaust state court remedies.45 In addition,
through its express grant of jurisdiction, the Act implicitly repeals the so-called
Rooker/Feldman doctrine for any action the parents brought, which might otherwise have prohibited a federal district court from considering the merits of
such a claim because it would be the functional equivalent of an appeal of a
state court judgment. 46
Second, Section 2 instructs the district court as to the impact of prior
state court proceedings concerning Terri Schiavo:
In such a suit, the District Court shall determine de novo any
claim of a violation of any right of Theresa Marie Schiavo
within the scope of this Act, notwithstanding any prior State
court determination and regardless of whether such a claim has
previously been raised, considered, or decided in State court
proceedings.47

Even one of the Act's principal supporters, Senate Majority Leader Frist, acknowledged this
point quite clearly. He said unequivocally that "[tihe bill guarantees a process to help Terri but
does not guarantee a particular outcome." 151 CONG. REc. S3099, 3101 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2005).
To be sure, Senator Frist also made clear that he "would expect that a Federal judge would grant
the stay." Id. But those expectations were not the law.
43
Pub. L. No. 109-03, § 1.
44
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
45
Pub. L. No. 109-03, § 2.
46
I discuss the Rooker/Feldman doctrine below. See infra Part II.C.2.c. Ms. Schiavo's parents
had filed previous suits in federal court that had been dismissed pursuant to the doctrine. See, e.g.,
Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Greer, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4182 (Mar. 18, 2005). I discuss the
potential implication of these dismissals under the Act below. See infra Part II.B.3 and Part
II.C.2.d.
47
Pub. L. No. 109-03, § 2.
42
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At a minimum, this language eliminates principles of claim and issue preclusion
as barriers to the parents' suit. 48 The question is what more the Act's reference
to "de novo" review might imply.
In the litigation actually filed, one judge in dissent argued that the reference to "de novo" review required the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing. Thus, the argument continued, the district court's refusal to grant an injunction requiring the reinsertion of the feeding tube without such a hearing was
legal error. 49 The majority of the Eleventh Circuit panel rejected this reading of
the statutory language. It held first that the Act did not alter the traditional standards for granting injunctive relief.50 Accordingly, the parents needed to establish, among other things, that they had a likelihood of succeeding on the merits
of their claims. 51 Because the parents had not done so, they were not entitled to
any relief regardless of the Act's "de novo" language. 2

Id. Issues of claim and issue preclusion in federal court are generally governed by 28
U.S.C. § 1738, which is implicitly repealed as to jurisdiction granted under the Act. I discuss
issues concerning claim and issue preclusion in greater detail below. See infra Part II.C.2.d.
49
See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1239 (1 1th Cir. 2005) (Wilson, J.,
dissenting).
50
Id. at 1225 n.1, 1226-27; see also Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d
1378, 1383 n.2 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (reaching same conclusion). The panel majority put great emphasis on legislative history indicating that Congress did not intend the Act to include a direction
that the state court order be stayed pending the resolution of any federal litigation. Schiavo ex rel.
Schindler, 403 F.3d at 1227-28. Several members of Congress later filed a brief with the Supreme
Court arguing that the lower courts had thwarted Congressional intent. See, e.g., Abby Goodnough, Supreme Court Refuses to Hearthe Schiavo Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2005, at Al. The
Eleventh Circuit's holding is also be supported by two other arguments. First, there are additional
comments by the Senate Majority Leader in which he stated his understanding that "[die novo
review means the judge must look at the case anew. The judge need not rely on or defer to the
decision of previous judges." 151 CONG. REC. S3099, 3103 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2005). At the very
least this statement is a far cry from the position that the lower federal courts had ignored the will
of Congress. Second, Section 3 of the Act concerns "Relief' and specifically mentions injunctions. See Pub. L. No. 109-03, § 3. However, nowhere in that section or elsewhere does Congress
instruct a court to use something other than existing law concerning the availability of equitable
relief. Id.
51
Schiavo ex. rel. Schindler, 403 F.3d at 1226.
52
Id. It is also worth noting that the various opinions reaching this conclusion are skewed
48

due, in large part, to the parents' litigation strategy. The parents' original complaint in federal
court was based primarily on claims that Terri Schiavo's procedural due process rights had been
violated as a result of the manner in which the various state court litigations had proceeded. See
Schiavo ex. rel. Schindler, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 1383-84 (describing parents' claims). As the district
court noted, because the parents elected to base their claims on the state court proceedings, they
essentially asked the court to consider what the state court had done. See id. The parents eventually filed amended complaints asserting claims including those based on substantive due process.
See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1166-68 (M.D. Fla. 2005). By
this time, however, the basic interpretation of the statute had been established and was binding on
both the district and circuit courts under the law of the case doctrine. See Schiavo ex rel.
Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1261,1291-92 (M.D. Fla. 2005).
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In sum, then, and assuming the Eleventh Circuit was correct - as I will
do,53 Congress used the Act to create a federal forum for Terri Schiavo's parents
to litigate (and even re-litigate) any federal constitutional or statutory issues
raised by the order to withdraw their daughter's feeding tube. The Act did not
dictate any particular result in such litigation, either as to the ultimate constitutional and statutory questions or the preliminary procedural issues concerning
injunctive relief.54 Finally, Congress specifically relaxed certain procedural
rules that could have precluded a federal court from reaching the merits of any
lawsuit the parents filed. With this understanding of what the Act did, the next
section of this Article provides a survey of potential structural constitutional
issues the legislation raises.

II. A STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE ACT
This part of the Article catalogues the major constitutional issues under
the Act concerning, broadly speaking, separation of powers and federalism.
There are also potential constitutional objections to the Act focused more on
individual liberty concerns." While my discussion will touch on some of these
issues as they relate to the separation of powers and federalism concerns, most
of them are beyond the scope of this Article.
For discussion purposes, I have divided the federalism and separation of
powers concerns into four discrete topics. I first discuss the argument that the
Act founders as an inappropriate application of federal power against the sovereignty of the states.56 Second, I address the related, but distinct concern that the
Act is unconstitutional as an attempt by Congress to reverse a final court judgment. 57 Thereafter, I consider whether Congress's detailed directions as to the
manner in which a federal court was to resolve any challenge by Ms. Schiavo's
53
As I mention below, in addition to the fact that the analysis is persuasive, there is another
reason for accepting the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation. Court's are loath to interpret a statute in
such a way as to raise a constitutional infirmity, which would have been present under an alternate
interpretation of the Act. See infra note 146.
54
Because the court concluded - and I accept - that the Act did not purport to alter the standards by which injunctive relief is granted, this Article does not address the scope of Congressional authority to do so.
55
For example, one could argue that the Act infringed Ms. Schiavo's right to refuse medical
treatment. But that argument could face serious obstacles not the least of which is that the Supreme Court has been remarkably coy in explaining if such a right is protected by the Constitution. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (describing the
right in conditional terms); see also Michael P. Allen, Threshold of Life and Death, supra note 3,
at 981-87 (discussing in detail the Supreme Court's position concerning the status of a constitutional right to refuse medical treatment). Moreover, even if such a right does exist, there is no
guarantee that it was infringed in this case, at least not as a result of Congressional action. These
statements are not meant to refute an argument that there was a violation of Ms. Schiavo's federal
constitutional rights, but rather to suggest that the issue is by no means clear.
56
See infra Part II.A.
57
See infra Part II.B.
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parents renders the Act unconstitutional. 58 Finally, I analyze whether Congress's focus on only Ms. Schiavo's situation is constitutionally problematic. 59
As I will explain, none of these issues - alone or in combination - renders the
Act unconstitutional. Nevertheless, a consideration of these matters leads to a
number of conclusions about Congressional power concerning both the states
and the federal courts. It is to those matters I turn in Part EI.
A.

A PotentialIntrusion on State Sovereignty

An often-voiced objection to the Act was that Congress had crossed a
constitutional line separating national power from that of the states by allowing
federal court review of the Schiavo matter. 60 This "federalism" based objection
certainly has some facial appeal. By the time Congress acted there had been
years of state court litigation concerning Terri Schiavo in which numerous state
judges had made factual findings and legal conclusions. 6' Based on these court
rulings, a judicial order had been enforced after all the then-proper appeals had
been exhausted. It seems intuitively suspect that after all of this activity, Congress could provide for federal court review of what had transpired in the Florida state court system. Such an intuitive judgment about the federal-state balance, however, is not supported by constitutional text, precedent, or even good
''constitutional policy."
Far from showing an unconstitutional exercise of authority, what the
Schiavo legislation illustrates is one of Congress's most significant, but often
overlooked, powers: the ability to grant jurisdiction to the federal courts.
Among other things, Article I of the Constitution vests the "judicial Power of
the United States ' '62 in the Judicial Department and describes the jurisdiction of
the federal courts. 63 The Supreme Court has consistently held that, under Article III, the lower federal courts "are 'courts of limited jurisdiction. They pos-

58

See infra Part II.C.

59

See infra Part II.D.
This point was asserted as a reason not to pass the Act during Congressional debates. See,
e.g., 151 CONG. REc. S3099, 3100 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2005) (Statement of Senator Warner: Quoting the Tenth Amendment and stating that "[tihis is a principle of Federalism which, I believe, is
not being followed by Congress in enacting this legislation."). It was also widely present in media
statements concerning the Act. See, e.g., supra note 27 (cataloguing reaction in the media to passage of the Act). Moreover, certain academic commentators have also mentioned federalismbased concerns regarding the Act. See, e.g.,Allen, supra note 35; Treatise, supra note 35, at 299.
61
See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 3574 at *1 n.1 (Fla. Dist
Ct. App. Mar. 16, 2005) (listing reported decisions concerning Terri Schiavo in state (and federal)
courts through the date of the opinion).
62
U.S. CONST. art III, § 1. The content of the "judicial Power" is not defined expressly in the
60

Constitution. I discuss the appropriate meaning of this phrase and its importance in the Schiavo
matter below. See infra Parts II.B. 1 and II.C.I.
63
U.S. CONST. art III, § 2.
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sess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.' "64 Thus, Article III
sets the limits of potential federal jurisdiction, with actual jurisdiction within
those bounds brought to life via Congressional statutes.6 5
There is a lively and long-running academic debate concerning the extent of Congress's power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 66 With
respect to the "inferior" federal courts, 67 most of the debate centers on the extent

to which Congress may constitutionally restrict that jurisdiction.6 8 Thus, the

Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 2005 U.S. LEXIS 5015 at *12 (June 23,
2005) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).
65
See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 37, at § 5.1, 260-61 (describing interplay of consti64

tutional and statutory provisions).
66
The scholarship in this area is extensive, involves some of the most prominent academics in
the field, and spans over one-half century. For just a sampling of this commentary, see Akhil
Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of FederalJurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985); Theodore Eisenberg, CongressionalAuthority to Restrict Lower
FederalCourt Jurisdiction,83 YALE L. J. 498 (1974); Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The
Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1990); Michael J.
Gerhardt, The ConstitutionalLimits to Court-Stripping, 9 LEwis & CLARK L. REV. 347 (2005);
Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated
Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof FederalCourts and the Text ofArticle II1, 64 U. CHi. L. REV. 203
(1997); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof FederalCourts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., CongressionalPower
Over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Neo-FederalistInterpretationof Article III,
1997 BYU. L. REV. 847; Martin H. Redish, Same-Sex Marriage,the Constitution, and Congressional Power to ControlFederalJurisdiction: Be Careful What You Wish For,9 LEwiS & CLARK
L. REV. 363 (2005) [hereinafter Same-Sex Marriage]; Martin H. Redish and Curtis E. Woods,
CongressionalPower to Control the Jurisdictionof the Lower Federal Courts: A CriticalReview
and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45 (1975) [hereinafter New Synthesis]; Ronald D. Rotunda, CongressionalPower to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts and the
Problem of School Busing, 64 GEo L. J. 839 (1976); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court
1980 Term Forward:ConstitutionalLimitations on Congress'sAuthority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARv. L. REV. 17 (1981) [hereinafter Forward]; Lawrence H.
Tribe, JurisdictionalGerrymandering:Zoning Disfavored Rights out of the Federal Courts, 16
HARv. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 129 (1981) [hereinafter Disfavored Rights]; Mark Tushnet and Jennifer
Jaff, Why the Debate Over Congress' Power to Restrict the Jurisdictionof the FederalCourts is
Unending, 72 GEO. L. J. 1311 (1984); Theodore J. Weiman, Note, JurisdictionStripping, Constitutional Supremacy, and the Implications of Ex Parte Young, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1677 (2005);
Michael Wells, Congress'sParamountRole in Setting the Scope of Federal Jurisdiction,85 Nw.
U. L. REV. 465 (1991); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Daniel J. Meltzer, and David J. Shapiro,
HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 319-61 (4th ed. 2003)
[hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (canvassing the literature concerning the issue of Congressional
control over the jurisdiction of the federal courts). Some sense of this mass of material can be
found in Dean Caminker's excellent summary of the views of many of the academics writing in
this area. See Evan Caminker, Allocating the JudicialPower in a "Unified Judiciary",78 TEx. L.
REv. 1513, 1513 n.1 (2000).
67
A largely distinct issue concerns Congressional power to control the jurisdiction
of the
Supreme Court. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 337-342 (providing an overview of the matter). The Act does not raise this issue and I do not address it in this Article.
68
See supra note 66 (collecting representative commentary).
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issue is usually debated in the context of whether Congress may preclude the
litigation of certain claims in a federal district court without violating the separation of powers principles at the heart of the constitutional structure. 69 As the
sheer breadth of the academic controversy over this matter suggests, the answer
to the proper scope of Congressional authority in this regard is by no means
clear.
The Schiavo legislation does not raise the jurisdiction-restriction issue
with all its complex jurisprudential questions. Instead, it implicates the less
discussed, but no less important, question of Congress's power to bestow jurisdiction affirmatively. 70 This constitutional question bears on federalism. The
Act would be unconstitutional with respect to the granting of jurisdiction itself
only if there were some constitutional limitation on Congress's authority to do
so. 7' That power is textually restricted only by the definition of the upper limit
of the jurisdiction of the judicial department under Article 1II, Section 2.72
The federalism-based objection to the Act appears to be based primarily, if not exclusively, on a belief that there is an objectively correct allocation
of judicial authority under the Constitution between state and federal courts that
transcends the specific text of Article Ill. This view is incorrect; the Constitution
creates no such allocation. Instead, within the confines of Article III, Section 2,
the "proper" allocation of judicial authority in our federal system is left to the
discretion of Congress. It is essentially a political judgment.
Not only is the federalism-based objection to the Act bereft of support
in the Constitution's text (or Supreme Court precedent), it is also not a matter of
good "constitutional policy." If one were to take the federalism objection seri69

See, e.g., id. There are exceptions to this general observation, but they are few and far be-

tween. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 66, at 4-8 (discussing the connections between Congressional restriction and conferral of jurisdiction); Judith Resnik, The Federal Courts and Congress:
Additional Sources, Alternative Texts, and Altered Aspirations, 86 GEO. L. J. 2589, 2593-96,
2613-27 (1998) (discussing issues related to Congressional conferral of subject matter jurisdiction
in the federal courts).
70
I do not consider here whether some other basis exists for Congressional action in the
Schiavo matter such as one of its Article I powers or authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. While arguments could be made for power under either or both of these parts of the
Constitution, the Act is best read as an implementation of Congressional power to control the
jurisdiction of the federal courts.
71 I consider below whether the Act's focus on a single case alters the analysis. See infra Part
II.D. This part considers jurisdictional grants more generally.
72
U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cl. 1. The Court has long taken this position. See, e.g., Mayor of
Nashiville v. Cooper, 73 U.S. 247, 251-52 (1867); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 448-49 (1850);
Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 U.S. 8, 9 (1799) (opinion of Chase, J.). There are academic
debates concerning the meaning of the jurisdictional grant in Article III. See supra note 66 (collecting various academic writings on the scope of Article III's jurisdictional provisions). It is not
necessary to take a position concerning these debates in connection with the Act. Under any
reading of the clear text of Article III, Congress at a minimum has the authority to bestow jurisdiction on the inferior federal courts so long as that jurisdictional grant comes within the ambit of the
terms of Section 2.
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ously, it would mean that Congress was precluded from providing any federal
review of federal constitutional or statutory issues (beyond the Supreme Court)
if those issues were adjudicated originally in a state court. Such a rule could
have dramatic consequences. First, it would limit the ability of the federal legislature to act to protect federal rights. One need not take a position on whether
the state or federal courts are objectively "better" at protecting such rights73 in
order to assert that Congress should at a minimum have the ability to conclude
for itself that federal courts should play a role in the interpretation of federal
rights.74
Second, it is well-established that Congress may create exclusive federal
jurisdiction for certain matters.75 In such situations state courts are entirely
foreclosed from engaging in the adjudicatory process. It would seem odd if,
consistent with principles of federalism, Congress could totally divest the states
from acting but could not take the relatively less-intrusive step of providing for
federal review (either by direct appeal or collaterally) of state action.76 If there
is a silent federalism restriction in Article III, one would not expect it to work in
this way.
Third, the hypothesized federalism restriction would seriously undermine the authority of Congress to provide federal habeas corpus review of state
court criminal convictions. Such relief is currently available and has been for
quite some time. 77 There are certainly differences between the Terri Schiavo
73
There is much discussion in the academic literature termed the "parity debate" concerning
whether the state or federal courts are better at protecting federal rights. See HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 66, at 322-25 (providing an overview of the parity debate).
74
Exactly how this argument might play out for those aspects of federal jurisdiction that go
beyond pure federal rights guaranteed by the Constitution or federal statutes is more complicated.
For example, would Congress have the ability to provide for federal review of state court decisions if the requirements of diversity of citizenship in Article III, Section 2 were satisfied? This
question goes beyond the scope of this Article and so I will not attempt to address it here. However, much of the logic counseling in favor of a broad power of Congress to allocate jurisdiction
within the confines of Article HI supports an affirmative answer to the question.
75
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000) (granting district courts exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime matters); 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2000) (granting district courts exclusive jurisdiction concerning matters under the Bankruptcy Code); 28 U.S.C. § 1351(2000) (granting district
courts exclusive jurisdiction concerning civil actions against "consuls or vice consuls of foreign
states" and "members of a mission or members of their families").
76
One might argue that the review situation is actually more problematic as a matter of federalism because the state courts could in some manner be "offended" by federal oversight of their
actions in a way that would not apply when state courts have never acted. Such an argument,
however, does not square well with precedent. The Court essentially rejected it in 1816 when it
upheld its own ability to review a state supreme court judgment for constitutional error. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816). Moreover, even if one assumes that state courts have
such "feelings," I am not sure that being totally foreclosed from an entire area of the law would, in
fact, be less offensive.
77
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2000); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 37, at § 15.2 (setting for
a "brief history of habeas corpus in the United States"). I discuss the current status of habeas law
below. See infra note 167.
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situation and the circumstances of persons convicted of crimes by state courts.
Nonetheless, it is difficult to see how any of those differences are useful in
drawing a constitutionally mandated line between appropriate and inappropriate
federal oversight. There might be policy reasons for drawing that line, but, as
discussed above, that would be a question committed to Congress.
In sum, the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution essentially set the
limits to which Congress could "intrude on" state judicial decision-making
through the specification of the potential jurisdictional limit of the federal
courts. The Act comfortably fits within those limits. Congress had the authority
under the Constitution to provide for federal jurisdiction in the Schiavo matter
so long as doing so was consistent with Article III. It was, and federalism-based
arguments against the Act should be rejected. 7
B.

Attempted Reversal of a Final Court Decision

The second potential constitutional objection to the Act is that it is an
attempt by Congress to reverse the final judgment of a court. Lawyers opposing
Ms. Schiavo's parents' lawsuit made this point vigorously 79 as have certain academic commentators. 80 It was also raised as a ground for opposition the legislation in Congress.8" Once again, despite its surface appeal, this objection lacks
merit.
I assume that had Congress actually dictated the substantive result in
any litigation the Act would be unconstitutional.8 2 As described above, the Act
The Act restricts jurisdiction to "the alleged violation of any right of Theresa Marie Schiavo
under the Constitution or laws of the United States relating to the withholding or withdrawal of
food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary to sustain life." Pub. L. No. 109-03, § 1. This section of the Act comes within the Article III grant of power concerning matters "arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority." U.S. CONST. art III, § 2.
79
See, e.g., Opposition to Motion for Injunction at 19, filed in Schiavo ex rel Schindler v.
Schiavo, Civ. Act. No. 8:05-CV-530-T-27TBM (M. D. Fla.) (March 21, 2005), available at
http://www.miani.edu/ethics2/Schiavo/ 032105-%20fed%20dist%20ct.%20response.pdf ("The
statute also directly violates core notions of separation of powers and federalism by effectively
suspending a final court judgment that adjudicated Mrs. Schiavo's state and federal constitutional
rights.").
80
See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 25 (noting that "[p]erhaps [the Act] ran afoul of the constitutional
doctrine forbidding Congress from changing the outcome in a litigated case in which there has
been a final judgment."); Hudson, supra note 25 (quoting Professor Chemerinsky as saying: "This
is Congress attempting to determine the outcome of a specific case.").
81
See, e.g., 151 CONG. REc. H1700, 1710 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2005) (Statement of Representa78

tive Davis including the comment that: "This Congress is on the verge of telling States and judges
and juries that their laws, their decisions do not matter.").
82
See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146-47 (1872). In fact, Klein may not be so welldefined. The modern day Supreme Court has been remarkably unwilling to define Klein's actual
holding, stating repeatedly that the "precise scope" of Klein is not clear. See, e.g., Miller v.
French, 530 U.S. 327, 348-49 (2000); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995);
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 436, 441 (1992). The Court has indicated that
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was interpreted not to do so and this Article proceeds on that basis.83 But even
if that is the case, the Act could still be unconstitutional if it seeks to overturn a
judicial determination after it had become final. This argument potentially operates on two separate constitutional axes in Ms. Schiavo's case because there
are two court systems implicated by Congress's action. First, there is yet another federalism concern because the Act could be seen to reverse (or at least
affect) the judgment entered in the Florida State court system. Second, there is
also a potential separation of powers issues because, while less discussed, there
were also two federal court cases filed by Ms. Schiavo's parents before the Act
became law. The Act raises distinct issues with respect to each of these two
court systems. I address them separately below. Before doing so, this Part first
sets out the basic law on which critics of the Act rely when making constitutional arguments based on the reopening and/or reversal of a final court decision.
1.

Reopening Final Judgments of the Judiciary: The Basic Law

In 1991, the Supreme Court held that "litigation instituted pursuant to
[certain federal securities laws for which there was exclusive federal jurisdiction] .. .must be commenced within one year after the discovery of the facts
Congress may constitutionally dictate the "rule of decision" in a case if Congress amends substantive law while the case is pending on direct appeal. See, e.g., Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218 (noting that
Klein "refused to give effect to a statute that was said to prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial
Department of the government in cases pending before it. Whatever the precise scope of Klein,
however, later decisions have made clear that its prohibition does not take hold when Congress
amends applicable law.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Klein's opacity is only
reinforced by considering much academic commentary on the decision, an exercise that yields
numerous "meanings" of the decision. See, e.g., James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some
Effectual Power": The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 815-23 (1998) (arguing, in essence that Klein is best understood as making the same point, less clearly, than Marbury does); Martin H. Redish, FederalJudicial Independence: Constitutional and Political Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 718-21 (1995)
[hereinafter Judicial Independence] (attempting to reconcile Klein and later cases); Lawrence G.
Sager, Klein's FirstPrinciple: A Proposed Solution, 86 GEo. L. J. 2525, 2528-29 (1998) (arguing
that Klein stands for the proposition that Congress cannot force a federal court "to speak and act
against its own best judgment on matters within its competence which have great consequence for
our political community"); Gordon G. Young, CongressionalRegulation of Federal Courts' Jurisdictionand Processes: United States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 WIs. L. REV. 1189, 1260 ("The
particular holding in Klein prohibits Congress from using its jurisdictional powers to manipulate
federal courts so as to reach decisions which, if addressed in terms of substantive law, would be
forbidden by the Constitution.").
Eleventh Circuit Judge Birch has undertaken the most sustained attack on the constitutionality of
the Act. See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1272-76 (11 th Cir. 2005) (Birch
J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc). In that indictment, Judge Birch relies on Klein by
arguing that the rule from that case renders the Act unconstitutional because the detailed procedures specified in Section 2 of the Act essentially prescribe the equivalent of a "rule of decision."
Id. at 1274-76. I discuss, and reject, this argument below. See infra Part II.C.2.
83 See supra Part 1.
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constituting the violation and within three years after such violation." 84 Pursuant to that decision, the federal courts dismissed as untimely lawsuits not commenced within this period.85 Congress was displeased with the Court's decision
and took steps to provide for a longer statute of limitations. 86 In addition to applying to all suits in which judgment had not yet become final, Congress also
sought to have its longer statute of limitations apply to cases that had been dismissed under the Court's ruling and for which those dismissals had become
final judgments with all avenues of appeal exhausted.8 7 It did so by purporting
to allow litigants who had been thrown
out of court to reopen their cases and
88
limitation.
time
new
the
under
proceed
In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,89 the Supreme Court considered
whether Congress's action allowing the reopening of these dismissed cases was
permissible under the Constitution. The Court held that it was not. 90 The Court
eschewed reliance on due process principles and instead confined its discussion
to the constitutional separation of powers. 9' The Court reasoned that Congress's
actions had "exceeded its authority by requiring the federal courts to exercise
'the judicial Power of the United States,'
. . . in a manner repugnant to the text,
92
structure, and traditions of Article 11."
Several points from Plaut are useful when considering the Act. First,
on its terms, Plaut is confined to the relationship between Congress and Article
93
1II courts.
Thus, to the extent one uses the decision to address Congressional
power with respect to state courts, one must do so by extension or analogy.
Second, the Court's focus is essentially on the meaning of the undefined
phrase the "judicial Power of the United States." It is the "judicial Power" that
the Constitution vests in the federal judiciary.9 4 And the Court identified two
central ingredients of the power: (1) "the Federal Judiciary [has] the power, not
merely to rule on cases, but to decide them;" 95 and (2) the decisions of Article
84

Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364 (1991).

See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 213-24 (1995) (discussing dismissals
under Lampf).
85
86

Id. at 214-15.

87

Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1 (1988 & Supp. V)).

88

Id.

89
90

514 U.S. 211 (1995).
Id. at 218-40.

91

Id. at 217.

92

Id. at 217-18 (internal citation omitted).

93

Id.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish."). The content of the "judicial Power" that is vested in the judicial department is a
matter of dispute. I discuss this issue in more detail below when considering the extent of Congressional authority to prescribe the manner of judicial decisionmaking. See also infra Part II.C.1.
95 Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218-19.
94
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II courts are "subject to review only by superior courts in the Article 1I hierarchy .... ,, 96
Third, and related, the Court was concerned with protecting the finality
of judicial decisions, not for the sake of the parties (although the due process
issue could come into play here) but rather out of concern for the roles of the
respective branches of the federal government. 97 To the Court, allowing Congress to reverse a final determination of the Article III judiciary would violate
the constitutional separation of powers because it would intrude on the exercise
of a9 8 coordinate branch of government of its constitutionally bestowed authority.

Finally, the Court attempted to distinguish final judgments involving
money judgments from those mandating prospective injunctive relief. 99 As the
Court explained in a later decision "We emphasized [in Plaut] that 'nothing in
our holding today calls ... into question' Congress' authority to alter the pro-

spective effect of previously entered injunctions.
96

Prospective relief under a

Id. This point concerning appellate review is usually attributed to Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S.

409 (1792), which the modem Court has described as "stand[ing] for the principle that Congress
cannot vest review of the decisions of Article III courts in officials of the Executive Branch."
Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218.
97
Plaut, 514 U.S. at 227. The Court recognized that the legislature could affect the outcome
of a case by amending the applicable law so long as all direct appeals had not been exhausted. Id.
at 226-27 ("It is the obligation of the last court in the hierarchy that rules on the case to give effect
to Congress's latest enactment, even when that has the effect of overturning the judgment of an
inferior court, since each court, at every level, must 'decide according to existing laws."' (quoting
United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103, 109 (1801)). But after those appeals were complete,
the judicial branch had finally spoken and legislative power was no longer effective. Id. at 227
("Having achieved finality, however, a judicial decision becomes the last word of the judicial
department with regard to a particular case or controversy, and Congress may not declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable to that very case was something other than what the
courts said it was.") (emphasis in original).
98
A similar violation occurs when instead of inhibiting another branch in the exercise of its
constitutional authority Congress takes that authority upon itself. I discuss this issue below in
connection with the Act's singular focus on Terri Schiavo. See infra Part ll.D. While not entirely
equivalent, these two ways of viewing the issue (i.e., Congress impeding the judiciary in its function and Congress acting like the judiciary) are similar to the functionalist and formalist conceptions of separation of powers. In simplistic terms, the formalist conception finds a constitutional
violation when one branch of government acts outside its constitutional boundaries whether or not
such action intrudes on the functions of another branch. See Judicial Independence, supra note
82, at 709-11 (discussing formalism). The functionalist approach identifies a violation when a
branch unduly interferes with another branch's core function whether or not that first branch is
acting within its constitutional boundaries. Id. at 711-12 (discussing functionalism). The Court
has been inconsistent in its articulation of the "proper" view of this question. At times it has used
a formalist approach. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). At others, it has adopted
a more functionalist attitude. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S.
833 (1986). In my estimation, the formalist and functionalist conceptions are simply two means
by which there can be a violation of the constitutional guarantee of separation of powers. Accordingly, I proceed on that assumption for the balance of this Article.
99
Plaut,514 U.S. at 232-33.
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continuing, executory decree remains subject to alteration due to changes in the
underlying law."' °
Having set forth the basic rules governing Congressional power to order
the reopening of judicial decisions, this Part now turns to an application of those
principles to the Act. I first consider the impact of the Act on Florida state court
decisionmaking. Thereafter, I turn to its impact on certain federal court decisions.
2.

The Act and Florida State Court Decisions

The most obvious application of the Act is with respect to the numerous
decisions of the Florida state courts concerning Terri Schiavo's end-of-life
wishes. Indeed, Section 2 specifically refers to the state court proceedings six
times. 0 1 Thus, one must confront the argument that Congress has overstepped
some constitutional boundary by allowing review of those state court proceedings in federal court.10 2 As discussed above, there is no credible federalismbased objection to Congressional power to bestow jurisdiction on the federal
courts. 0 3 As discussed below, there is similarly no constitutional defect in the
Act based on improper Congressional interference with a state court in particular.
A direct appeal to Plaut as controlling precedent is not helpful in attacking the Act. As described above, that case dealt with Article Ill courts and separation of powers concerns °4 But there remains the question whether the underlying principles of Plaut should apply with respect to a Congressional action
vis-A-vis a state court. They should not.
The central focus of Plaut was the relationship between the coordinate
legislative and judicial branches of the federal government. The Court's concern in striking down Congressional action in that case was that Congress was
altering the power balance between the branches in a manner that was inconsistent with the constitutional design.10 5 As such, too much power was potentially
100 Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 344 (2000) (quoting Plaut, 514 U.S. at 232, citations omitted, ellipses in original).
101 See Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 2.
102
I am assuming for purposes of this discussion that the state court judgment at issue is a
"final judgment" for purposes of Plaut. That point is not necessarily correct. It is true that the
Florida Supreme Court has held that the order directing the withdrawal of Ms. Schiavo's feeding
tube, even though executory, was a final judgment. See Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 329-32
(Fla. 2004). But there is no guarantee that a federal court would be bound by such a finding. Cf.
Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 2005 U.S. LEXIS 5214 at *15-*16 (June 27, 2005) (discussing the fact
that a state law determination that something is a property interest will not bind the Supreme
Court when determining whether such a property interest rises to the level that it is protected by
the Due Process Clause).
103
See supra Part II.A.
104
105

See supra Part II.B.1.
See, e.g., Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218-19.
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being concentrated in a single branch of government,
something that the Fram6
ers feared would erode individual liberty.'
The relationship between the national government and those of the
states in our federal system is also a complex one. However, it does not operate
on the same level as the one between and among the branches of the federal
government. It is hackneyed but accurate to describe the power of the national
government in our constitutional system as limited when compared to the power
held by the states. Yet, in those situations in which the national government has
been granted power under the Constitution, it is supreme. 107 One such area of
supremacy is the exercise of the "judicial Power of the United States" in those
matters within the scope of Article III of the Constitution. The federal judiciary
may exercise the "judicial Power" only with respect to the nine categories of
actions set forth in Article 111.108 But within those categories, a judgment is reflected in the Constitution itself that federal authority may "intrude" on that of
the several states. Thus, unlike the concern in the separation of powers context
regarding the preservation of the spheres of authority of the respective branches
of the federal government, the constitutional text moots a similar worry in terms
of the national/state balance of authority with respect to the specifically defined
potential scope of federal subject matter jurisdiction.
This same constitutional reality makes the PlautCourt's subsidiary reasoning inapplicable. The concern expressed in that case for the finality of
106 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 249 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001) ("The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in
the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, selfappointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."); see also Clinton v.New York,
524 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing impact of separating government power on liberty); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Holmes J., dissenting)
("The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787 not to promote
efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction,
but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers
among three departments, to save the people from autocracy."); Bruce G. Peabody & John D.
Nugent, Toward a Unifying Theory of the Separation of Powers, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 12 (2003)
(describing that in the scholarly community "the dominant view holds that these institutional
divisions [separating government power] were intended to serve the 'negative' purpose of creating
multiple and mutual checks to avoid the tyrannical accumulations of power."); Martin H. Redish
& Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If Angels Were to Govern ": The Need for PragmaticFormalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 451 (1991) ("By simultaneously dividing power among
the three branches and institutionalizing methods that allow each branch to check the others, the
Constitution reduces the likelihood that one faction or interest group that has managed to obtain
control of one branch will be able to implement its political agenda in contravention of the wishes
of the people.").
107 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VI ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
108 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See also supra Part II.A (discussing limited nature of potential federal subject matter jurisdiction).
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judgments and the protection of Article III decisionmaking from non-Article III
entities simply does not fit within the structure of the Constitution. Under that
structure, Congress may constitutionally authorize a reopening of the state court
judgments for the purpose of allowing federal review of matters within Article
III because doing so implements the constitutional design, not subverts it. 109
In the final analysis, Plaut's rationale simply does not apply in the context of Congressional authorization of the re-opening of state court decisions.110
As such, the Act does not run afoul of Plautor any similar principle of constitutional law.'
3.

The Act and Federal Court Decisions

The Plaut issue is a bit more complicated because, in addition to the
state court decisions, there were also two federal court cases that Ms. Schiavo's
parents had brought in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida before the Act became law. 1 2 Both of these cases sought injunctive
109

As mentioned above, federal habeas corpus concerning state court convictions is the proto-

typical implementation of this constitutional design. See supra Part H.A. There is no readily
apparent constitutional reason, however, that it is or should be limited to that context. I return
briefly to this suggestion below. See infra Part III.D.
110 There is still the possibility held out in Plaut that due process principles could act as an
independent check on Congressional reopening of final court judgments. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at
217 (declining to address the due process issue). I believe that there are situations in which Congressional exercise of its powers concerning federal court jurisdiction could run afoul of constitutional liberty guarantees. An exploration of the contours of this issue, however, is largely beyond
the scope of this Article, although I do make a brief reference to these points below. See infra
Part III.C. Other commentators have suggested possible individual liberty checks on Congressional power in this area, usually focused on limits imposed on federal court jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Gerhardt, supra note 66, at 348; Gunther, supra note 66, at 916-22; Hart, supra note 66, at
1372-73; Same-Sex Marriage,supra note 66, at 368-69; New Synthesis, supra note 66, at 76-81;
Rotunda, supra note 66, at 851-54; Forward,supra note 66, at 78-80; Disfavored Rights, supra
note 66, at 13946.
III If one concluded that Plaut did apply, Congress could not take refuge in Plaut's assurance
that the case did not affect Congress's power to alter the prospective effect of equitable relief. See
supra Part II.B. 1. The Plaut Court was referring to situations in which an injunction or other
equitable relief was premised on certain principles of substantive law that had now been changed.
See, e.g., Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 346-50 (2000) (discussing the principle in connection
with certain provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling
and Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421, 431-32 (1856) (concerning Congressional action dealing
with an injunction preventing construction of a bridge that was thought to be a hindrance to navigation and a burden on interstate commerce). Congress's actions concerning Terri Schiavo do not
fit this mold. It is true that the state court action led to an injunction. See In re Guardianship of
Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 176-77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). But the Act did not change any substantive law, even assuming that Congress had the power to do so. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 109-3, §
5. Thus, Congressional action would not be protected by the equitable-relief exception Plaut
contemplates.
112 See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Greer, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4182 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 18,
2005); Schindler v. Schiavo, 8:03-cv-T-26EAJ (M.D. Fla. October 2003).
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relief reinserting Ms. Schiavo's feeding tube. Both of them were dismissed on
the ground that the suit would contravene the Rooker/Feldman doctrine by having a federal district court consider the functional equivalent of an appeal from a
state court decision.1 13 One of the Act's procedural requirements overrode the
Rooker/Feldman doctrine.' 14 It would15 appear that Plaut would be implicated by
at least the earlier of these decisions.'
Congress may very well have been aware of this potential difficulty. At
the very least, the Act - by design or perhaps serendipity - avoids this serious
potential issue under Plaut. The Act removes procedural impediments such as
res judicata only with respect to state court decisions.' 1 6 At no point does Congress instruct the federal courts to ignore prior federal decisions. Thus, those
federal decisions could have provided a basis upon which to challenge the propriety of the parents' later lawsuit. Such a claim may not have been successful,
but the Act did not foreclose it. No party requested, and no court discussed,
those prior federal decisions. Nonetheless, the precise language of the Act
avoided any Plaut issue with respect to an Article III court.
C.

Control of the Manner of JudicialDecisionmaking

United States Circuit Judge Stanley Birch mounted the most sustained
constitutional critique of the Act.' 17 Judge Birch focused on what he saw as the
Act's violation of fundamental principles of separation of powers. 18 More concretely, his claim was that because it "constitute[s] legislative dictation of how a
federal court should exercise its judicial functions (known as a "rule of decision"), the Act invades the province of the judiciary and violates the separation
of powers principle."'" 9 Judge Birch was concerned not that Congress had expressly directed the federal courts to rule in a certain substantive way. Rather,
his point was that Congress had somehow inappropriately dictated the manner
in which the federal courts would rule on challenges under the Act. 20 In this
Part, I consider the merits of the fundamental thrust of Judge Birch's argument.
13
See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler, 2005 U.S. Dist LEXIS 4182 at *2 (discussing 2003 case and
reaching same conclusion). I discuss the Rooker/Feldman doctrine below. See infra Part II.C.2.c.
114 See supra Part I (discussing the Act's structure).

The later decision would probably not be problematic. The time to appeal had not yet expired. Therefore, Congress retained the ability to alter the substantive law - here the impact of the
statutory Rooker/Feldman doctrine -- so that an appellate court would apply the then-current rule.
See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 227.
116 See Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 2. I discuss the res judicata issue in more detail below. See infra
Part II.C.2.d.
117 See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1272-76 (11 th Cir. 2005) (Birch,
J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc). Judge Tjoflat responded to Judge Birch's constitutional arguments. Id. at 1280-81 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
"a
Id. at 1273-76.
119 Id. at 1273-74.
"5

120

Id. at 1273-76.
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'2
"The Judicial Power of the United States"' 1

Judge Birch's assessment of the Act raises a critical question under our
Constitution's structure: what exactly is the content of the "judicial Power of the
United States" that is vested in federal courts. 22 The answer to that question is
important because that power belongs to the judicial branch and under separa23
tion of powers principles its exercise may not be impeded by another branch.
This sub-part lays out my vision of this important question. I then apply it to the
Act. 124
The concept of constitutional "judicial Power" can be thought of in
three distinct parts. 25 First, there are those attributes that are essential to the
121 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
122

Dean Caminker has written an interesting article in which he argues that the full "judicial

Power of the United States," whatever it may be, need not vest in every individual federal court so
long as it is fully vested in the judicial department as a whole. See Caminker, supra note 66, at
1515-17. I need not address Dean Caminker's thesis here because the Act concerns all Article III
courts. Thus, should one conclude that it removes some aspect of the "judicial Power" it does so
for the entire judicial department.
123
See supra note 98 (discussing functional and formalist views of separation of powers).
124
What did the Framers intend to be encompassed in the "judicial Power of the United
States?" First, the historical record is not particularly helpful in addressing this query. See, e.g.,
Gary Lawson, ControllingPrecedent: CongressionalRegulation of JudicialDecision-Making, 18
CONST. COMMENT. 191, 202 (2001) ("Historical research tells us almost nothing about what this
'judicial Power' was likely to entail in 1789."); Michael L. Wells & Edward J. Larson, Original
Intent and Article Ii, 70 TUL. L. REV. 75, 77 (1995) (noting that "the materials bearing on the
origins of the [federal court] system are fragmentary, ambiguous, and contradictory..."). Even
Professors Liebman and Ryan, who have conducted the most thorough review of the historical
records, recognize the limitations of the historical record. See, e.g., Liebman & Ryan, supra note
82, at 708-09 (noting that the points they have distilled from the records "arise[] not from what
little was said and recorded about the various proposals and counterproposals, drafts and redrafts,
but from the consistent patterns that the contending texts reveal - most notably, the subtle but
steady shift from reliance on the quantity to the quality of federal judging to maintain federal legal
supremacy.") (emphasis in original). More fundamentally, however, I am by no means convinced
that the intentions of the Framers should bind the People today, at least not as to the meaning of
Article III. See generally Kent S. Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and the Legislative
Power, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 888, 893-94 (1998) (raising doubts about the validity of relying on the
Framers intentions); Wells & Larson, supra this note, at 94-95 (arguing that "originalism" is misplaced in debates concerning federal court jurisdiction). Of course, neither should we cavalierly
reject "original meaning" or "original understanding" simply because it is "original." Cf., Amar,
supra note 66, at 208 n.7 (discussing different ways in which to use evidence concerning the
intent of the Framers). This is not the place to engage in a debate about the place of intention in
constitutional interpretation. Suffice it to say that the historical record in this case, even if relevant, is sufficiently sparse to undercut its usefulness.
125
Many commentators discuss the jurisdictional grants in Article III, Section 2 as being part of
the "judicial Power" that is vested pursuant to Article III, Section 1. See, e.g., Amar, supra note
66, at 215, 233, 239-40; Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction:
Early Implementation of and DeparturesFrom the ConstitutionalPlan, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1515,
1516-17 (1986); Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided
Questfor the Original Understandingof Article II1, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 753-54 (1984); Gunther, supra note 66, at 899-90; Forward, supra note 66, at 2330-31; Wieman, supra note 66, at

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol108/iss2/4

26

2005]

Allen: Congress and Terri Schiavo: A Primer on the American Constitution
CONGRESS AND TERRI SCHIA VO

functioning of an Article HI court. With respect to those features, Congress may
not legislate because doing so would upset the constitutional balance by undermining the ability of the judicial department to operate as a co-equal branch of
the federal government. I refer to these attributes as "core" elements of the "judicial power." 126 Second, are those areas that are simply beyond the power of
the courts to address. These are "excluded" features in terms of the "judicial
Power."'' 27 Finally, there are powers that are not core ones but that are also not
excluded. I refer to these elements as "ancillary." As to these ancillary matters,
the courts may act.1 28 But if Congress has acted with respect to such ancillary
matters, the courts must yield and follow that Congressional direction, at least
so long 12as
doing so would not undermine a core element of the "judicial
9
Power."

1683-84. I believe that the two sections of Article III are designed to deal with two distinct issues. Section 1 bestows the power on Article III courts that is automatically vested under the
constitutional structure. In other words, whenever such a tribunal has jurisdiction in a case or
controversy, the essential attributes of the "judicial Power" must be present. Section 2 defines the
discrete areas over which the federal courts may exercise the "judicial Power," whatever its contours. Some of the academic commentators have also proceeded on this assumption. See, e.g.,
Caminker, supra note 66, at 1514-17; Harrison, supra, note 66, at 210-11, 215; Liebman & Ryan,
supra note 82, at 700-04. The resolution of this issue is not critical to a consideration of the Act.
It becomes so when one confronts jurisdiction-stripping proposals, something beyond the scope of
this Article.
126
Other commentators have also approached the problem of Article III's meaning by positing
that there is some irreducible set of attributes that is captured by the phrase the "judicial Power of
the United States." See, e.g., David E. Engdahl, Intrinsic Limits of Congress' Power Regarding
the Judicial Branch, 1999 BYU L. REv. 75, 79-84 (discussing what he terms "judicial potency");
Liebman & Ryan, supra note 82, at 768-71 (discussing the mandated attributes of "the judicial
Power"); Judicial Independence, supra note 82, at 698-99 (outlining four elements of judicial
independence that Article III courts must possess). I discuss many of these commentators' views
in more detail throughout this section of the Article.
127 Examples of such excluded powers are varied, ranging from enacting legislation to issuing
advisory opinions. The former is a power unambiguously assigned to another branch of government. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § I ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States..."). The latter limitation is derived from an interpretation of constitutional text informed by history and prudence. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 66, at 78-82
(discussing the asserted prohibition on advisory opinions); Liebman & Ryan, supra note 82, at
769 (grounding the prohibition on issuing advisory opinions in the need to keep the judiciary
independent of political disputes).
128 Professor Redish has referred to something akin to my core attribute as "decisional independence." See Judicial Independence, supra note 82, at 707. He also describes "lawmaking
independence" that "concerns a judge's ability to fashion general substantive rules of decision or
rules of procedure that are designed to govern not only the case before her but future similarly
situated cases as well." Id. This later category overlaps in some respects with what I refer to as
the ancillary powers of the judiciary.
129 The idea of concurrent powers concerning rule-making has a long pedigree. See, e.g., A.
Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control over JudicialRule-making: A Problem
in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 3 (1958) ("For decades, if not for centuries,
control over practice and procedure has been the subject of a concurrent jurisdiction. There were
the courts with an alleged inherent power to engage in rule-making, and there were the legislatures
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The core attribute of the "judicial Power" is to adjudicate cases or controversies. Indeed, the Supreme Court told us as much when it chastised Congress for legislating in such a manner as to undermine the judicial department's
"power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them. .,13o But one can do
better than this description because the power to adjudicate may itself be broken
down into subsidiary elements that, taken together, comprise the core of the
"judicial Power." First, and perhaps most importantly, an Article III court must
have the power to resolve the dispute between the parties before it. I refer to
this element as "actual effectiveness" because it includes two related, but distinct sub-attributes. The court must have the ability to actually decide the dispute, meaning that it must be able to apply reasoned judgment to reach appropriate conclusions. This feature explains why Congress may not constitutionally
direct a court how to rule in a given case, at least not without amending the substantive law. 13 1 In my view, it also encompasses the notion of judicial review
from Marbury v. Madison because a court must have the ability to define the
law as part of its reasoning. 132 The court's ruling, however, must also be effective, meaning that the court must possess sufficient discretion to impose an appropriate remedy in the case. 133 Thus, this part of the core element of "the judi-

which in fact exercised and were, with but rare dissent, conceded ultimate authority over virtually
the entire procedural area.") (footnotes omitted). Despite the established nature of concurrent
rulemaking authority, debate still erupts in this area from time to time. See infra note 193 (discussing academic debates concerning Congressional "interference" with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
130
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc, 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995) (emphasis in original). Academic commentators have similarly recognized this fundamental point. See, e.g., Caminker, supra
note 66, at 1519 (describing the adjudicatory powers of the courts as "core"); Theodore K. Cheng,
Invading an Article III Court's Inherent Equitable Powers: Separation of Powers and the Immediate Termination Provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 969,
1006-07 ("Thus, the Framers intended that the judiciary's core adjudicative function be free from
legislative alteration. Decisionmaking, an essential element of the judiciary's adjudicatory powers, was to be left within the province of the Article III courts.").
131
See supra note 82 (discussing this principle). Professor Gary Lawson has also recognized
the importance of reasoning in the context of Article III decisionmaking. See Lawson, supra note
124, at 210 ("The judicial power of course includes the power to reason to the outcome of a
case.").
132
See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803). Professor Redish has
argued that the power of judicial review does not, in fact, flow from such a private rights model.
See Martin H. Redish, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER 5, 83, 90-92 (1991). I am
not asserting, however, that this rationale is the only one supporting judicial review. This Article
it not the place to enter the more general debate about the propriety and source of the power of
judicial review. Rather, my point is the modest one that whatever else its source might be, judicial
review is supported by this sub-prong of the "judicial Power."
133 Other scholars, in a number of contexts, have noted the importance of such remedial discretion. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 66,at 1366-70; Forward,supra note 66, at 80-89.
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cial Power" is focused less on inter-branch relations
and more on the relation1 34
ship between the judicial branch and the People.'
Second, once it has spoken, the judicial department's decision is final,
at least as to past matters, although the continuing effects of equitable decrees
can, in certain cases, be altered by the legislative branch. 13 This sub-attribute
of the "judicial Power" implicates both the relationship between the co-equal
federal branches as well as the relationship between the judiciary and the People. As to the former, the judiciary would not be sufficiently independent in the
constitutional structure if its decisions could be revised or reversed by the other
branches. As to the latter, the litigants, at least the ones who prevailed, have a
strong interest in preserving their victory.
Finally, the judicial department must ultimately be responsible for superintending itself and its decisions. In other words it must have "institutional
responsibility."' 136 Thus, the responsibility for policing
judgments for error
37
should be maintained within the Article Ell hierarchy.
134 In their historical study, Professors Liebman and Ryan set out a core set of "qualitative"
features that they assert are implicit in Article III's "judicial Power." See Liebman & Ryan, supra
note 82, at 696. This study is an impressive one by impressive scholars. However, its ultimate
definition of the "qualitative" attributes of Article III courts seems to have been driven in many
respects by the authors' particular concern with addressing then-recent changes in federal habeas
corpus law. The effect of this focus is that much of the discussion of Article III, including the
definition of the core elements of judging, appears to be skewed to reflect a habeas corpus take.
This comment is not meant to downgrade the work that Professors Liebman and Ryan have done.
It is amazingly thorough and insightful in many respects. Rather, I merely suggest that the conclusions they draw may need to be filtered through the habeas lens. In any event, among the
qualitative attributes identified by Liebman and Ryan are three that are, in at least some respect,
captured by my notion of "actual effectiveness." Id. ("An Article III court must decide (1) the
whole federal question .. . based on (4) the whole supreme law, and (5) impose a remedy that, in
the process of binding the parties to the court's judgment, effectuates supreme law and neutralizes
contrary law."). These attributes are not necessary co-extensive with my actual effectiveness
prong. I do not, however, explore the differences in my conception as part of this Article.
135 See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218-19. Liebman and Ryan also recognize finality as an element of
the core judicial function. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 82, at 696.
136 Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218 (citing Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. 409 (1792)). This notion may be
captured in part by Professors Liebman and Ryan in their reference to the core requirement of
judicial independence. See Liebman & Ryan, supra note 82, at 696. Judicial independence is
clearly important because, without it, the third branch of government would in reality be little
more than a puppet. However, I believe judicial independence is guaranteed less by the vesting of
the "judicial Power" and more by the specific independence guarantees in the balance of Article
III, Section 1. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts,
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for Their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office."); see
also Judicial Independence, supra note 82, at 700-06 (discussing these guarantees of what he
terms the "institutional independence" of the federal judiciary).
137 This core function is unique in that the constitutional structure specifically allows some
Congressional involvement. See U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2, cl. 2 (allowing Congress to regulate the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court). There is fierce debate about the meaning of the
Exceptions Clause. See James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Strippingand the Supreme Court's Power
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When evaluating whether a given piece of legislation concerning the judiciary is unconstitutional as a matter of separation of powers, one should use as
the polestar whether the legislative action expressly or implicitly undermines
actual effectiveness, finality or institutional responsibility with respect to the
adjudication of a matter within a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction. The
answer to this query will at times be a universal and easy one. A law instructing
the federal judiciary to rule against the plaintiff in all cases would be unconstitutional in all situations because it would trench upon the principle of actual effectiveness; there would be nothing to "decide" and thus the judgment would not
be the result of a reasoned judgment. On the other hand, legislation specifying
"procedures" to be followed by a court might undermine the decisional process
in some situations but not in others depending on the nature of the legislative
command. Accordingly, in order to assess whether a given piece of legislation
purporting to be procedural in fact undermines the core adjudicatory power of
the judicial branch, it is necessary to get into the details. I conduct such an inquiry in the balance of this section with respect to the Act. Along the way, I
expand on my conception of the nature of38the "judicial Power" in the context of
the specific statutory provisions at issue.
2.

The Procedural Directions in the Act are Consistent with the
Constitutional Separation of Powers

Section 2 of the Act sets forth the potentially constitutionally offensive
procedural dictates: (1) Granting Ms. Schiavo's parents standing; (2) removing
restrictions on the application of abstention and exhaustion doctrines; (3) removing the Rooker/Feldman restriction on inferior federal court review of state
court decision; and (4) specifying a "de novo" standard of review, effectively
negating principles of res judicata. 139 Each of these matters standing alone is an
entirely proper subject with respect to which Congress may legislate; none of
them implicates core values under the "judicial Power." Moreover, there is

to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEx. L. REV. 1433, 1436-42 (2000) (summarizing the literature

on this debate). I do not address this debate in this Article.
138 Professor Gerhardt has recently argued that the "judicial Power" should also be understood
historically "to include a power to create precedents of some degree of binding force." Gerhardt,
supra note 66, at 351. He made this argument in connection with Congressional attempts to undermine Supreme Court decisions with which the legislative branch disagreed. Id. I believe Professor Gerhardt's argument sweeps too broadly. There are situations in which Congress could
take an action concerning precedent that would be unlawful. For example, Congress could seek to
pass a statute reversing the judgment in the case in which the Court had rendered its decision. Of
course, Congress could also express its disapproval of a precedent by passing legislation dealing
only with prospective matters. In that regard, the disrespect for precedent would not be constitutionally suspect. Nor would it raise a suspicious constitutional eyebrow if Congress were to use
its jurisdictional powers in such a way as to undercut the utility of precedent if it did not transgress
some other constitutional boundary.
139 Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 2.
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nothing about the combination of procedural directions that changes this conclusion. As such, they relate - separately and together -- to ancillary matters with
respect to which Congress may act.
a.

Standing

Standing requirements fall into two groups: those that are "constitutional" - or mandated by Article H's case or controversy requirement - and
those that are prudential. 14° Congress may not override the prerequisite that 4a
plaintiff in federal court satisfy the constitutional requirements for standing.' '
Those requirements are part and parcel of the limitation on the matters over
which a federal court may be given jurisdiction. 42 The standard structural explanation for standing doctrine is that it is "built on a single basic idea - the idea
of separation of powers."' 143 That is certainly true, but one can also see the constitutional foundation of the doctrine as serving an important part of the allocation of responsibility between the state and federal governments, a federalism
objective. Inother words, the allowed "intrusion" on matters that would otherwise be heard in state courts is restricted by the constitutional elements of standing doctrine. But whatever the doctrinal foundation, there are certain elements
of standing over which Congress has no power.
Prudential standing exists on a different level. The Court has been unequivocal in its assertion that Congress has the power to overcome such nonconstitutional restrictions on a litigant's standing. 44 An independent assessment
leads to the same conclusion. 45 The elimination of a bar to hearing a claim
14 See Chemerinsky, supra note 37, at 59-61 (providing an overview of constitutional and
prudential standing requirements).
141 See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 n.3 (1997).
142

See id. at 818.

143 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
144 Raines, 521 U.S. at 820 n.3. Judge Tjoflat also recognized this point in his debate with

Judge Birch. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1280-81 (11 th Cir. 2005).
145
Professor David Engdahl has argued strongly that Congress does not have power to abrogate
prudential standing requirements, at least not in all situations. See Engdahl, supra note 126, at
164-67. For him, "[p]rudence is part of what judging is about, and the power to make judgments
about cases and controversies within the parameters of Article III - including whether it is prudent
to hear them - is constitutionally confided to the judiciary as an aspect of 'the judicial Power."'
Id. at 165 (emphasis in original). Professor Engdahl goes on to explain that, in his view, there is
nothing in the Constitution that gives Congress the authority to legislate concerning prudential
standing requirements in most cases due to the limited nature of legislative power delegated to
Congress under Article I. Id. at 166-67. To begin with, as described in the text, Professor Engdahl's approach finds no support in precedent. More importantly, however, I disagree with his
assessment concerning the fundamental nature of the "judicial Power." Prudence is certainly
important, as my requirement of actual effectiveness captures. However, the prudence protected
by Article III goes to the ability to make reasoned decision in cases before the court and not to the
selection of cases to be heard. To grant this power to the judicial branch would place in one entity
the choice of what matters it hears as well as the power to finally resolve those disputes largely
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does not undermine any of the three sub-elements of a federal court's core adjudicatory function. In fact, if anything it enhances the court's actual effectiveness by allowing adjudication to take place at all. Thus, Congress was well
within its authority to waive any prudential standing requirements that might
146
have prevented Ms. Schiavo's parents from pursuing a claim under the Act.
b.

Abstention

The same effect results concerning Congress's abrogation of the various
abstention doctrines. These judicially crafted doctrines have at their core an
affirmative decision by a federal court to not decide a case that is unquestionably within its jurisdiction. 47 There are different forms of abstention dealing
insulated from revision. Such a concentration of power is unwise and antithetical to the system
established by the Constitution.
I also disagree with Professor Engdahl concerning the scope of Congressional power more generally. He argues that there is no clause in the Constitution granting Congress the legislative power
to enact rules such as those concerning prudential standing. See id. at 166-167. He specifically
rejects the Necessary and Proper Clause (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18) in combination with either
what is commonly referred to as the Tribunals Clause of Article I (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9) or
Congressional power to create inferior Article III courts (see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1). Id. His
argument is essentially that both the Tribunals Clause and Article III concern the bringing into
existence in an effective way of a court. See id. at 104-119. The Necessary and Proper Clause
cannot be used to augment power under these other provisions, he asserts, unless that use is to
bring into execution the judicial power. Id. at 166-67. Because he sees prudential standing as
being a core feature of "the judicial Power," Congressional legislation on that subject would not
be "proper" because it would not be designed to bring into effect the "judicial Power." Id. Thus,
in reality Professor Engdahl and I have a disagreement not so much over Congressional power per
se but rather over the scope of the "judicial Power."
146
The Act's requirement granting the parents "standing" should be interpreted to mean prudential standing. Such an interpretation is in keeping with the maxim of statutory construction
that a statute should be interpreted to avoid rendering it unconstitutional. See Ernest A. Young,
ConstitutionalAvoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservationof JudicialReview, 78 TaX. L.
REV. 1549 (2000) (providing an excellent overview of the doctrine concerning "constitutional
avoidance"). In addition, it does not appear that any waiver of constitutional standing requirements would have been necessary in this case. While the point is not without doubt, it seems that
Mr. and Mrs. Schindler meet the three constitutional standing requirements, something no court
has ever questioned. At a minimum, there is a strong argument that they do. First, it would seem
that they have suffered an "injury in fact" through the withholding of nutrition and hydration from
their daughter. Indeed, Florida law recognizes that parents are "interested persons" in guardianship cases giving them certain procedural rights that strangers to the controversy do not have. See
In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 792 So. 2d 551, 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001). The parents' injury
was unquestionably caused by the action of which they complained, and it would be redressed by
the remedy they sought. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 37, at 61-83 (discussing the three
elements of constitutional standing doctrine).
147
See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 37, at 761-763 (providing overview of abstention
doctrines). There is a long-running academic debate concerning whether the abstention doctrines
themselves are a violation of separation of powers principles on the ground that an Article III
court cannot decline to exercise jurisdiction conferred by Congress. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish,
Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the JudicialFunction, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984)
(arguing that abstention is unconstitutional); Michael Wells, Why Professor Redish is Wrong
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with matters such as (1) a desire to avoid an unnecessary resolution of a federal
constitutional issue, 48 (2) a lack of clarity in relevant state law, 4 9 (3) the need
1 50
to defer to a state administrative proceedings in a complex area of state law,
(4) the desire to respect the coordinate decisionmaking of state courts by not
interfering in certain types of pending matters in which there is a significant
state interest, 51 and (5) in certain limited circumstances, a desire to avoid duplicative litigation. 52 Abstention is a prudential matter not one the Constitution
requires.153 Thus, as with the prudential standing requirements, Congress may
abrogate the abstention doctrines without offending the Constitution. 54 There
simply is no interference with the core adjudicatory function of the court. 55

About Abstention, 19 GA. L. REv. 1097 (1985) (defending the constitutionality of abstention doctrines). A consideration of the Act's constitutionality does not implicate this complicated question.
148
See Railroad Comm. of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
149
See La. Power and Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
150
See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
151
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
152 See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
153
See, e.g., Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11 th Cir. 2005) (Birch,
J., concurring) (describing abstention as a doctrine of "prudential decisionmaking" and citing
supporting cases). Professor Chemerinsky notes that with respect to so-called Younger abstention
there is some uncertainty whether the doctrine is entirely prudential. See Chemerinsky, supra note
37, at 802-03. But even if this abstention doctrine were constitutionally-based the Act would not
be rendered unconstitutional. As mentioned above, a court should interpret the Act in a manner to
sustain its constitutionality. See supra note 146. Thus, any constitutionally-mandated abstention
doctrines should not be included within the ambit of Section 2 of the Act. Moreover, it is not at
all clear that Younger abstention would apply to the Schiavo situation. First, there is no pending
Florida state criminal proceeding, the heart of Younger abstention. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra
note 37, at 799-801 (discussing Younger). In addition, it is not clear that there exist any circumstances in the Florida state proceedings that correspond to the extension of the Younger doctrine to
civil matters. See id. at 817-24 (discussing the application of Younger to civil matters). In this
case, Congress has used its constitutional power to confer jurisdiction on a federal court specifically to consider federal constitutional issues implicated in a state court proceeding. See supra
Part II.A (discussing jurisdictional issues). This is not a situation where a private party takes it on
itself to use a general jurisdictional statute to trump - not really review - an ongoing state action.
See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987).
154
The same is true with respect to Congress's closely-related direction that a federal court
should not require a plaintiff exhaust appropriate state avenues of relief. See Pub. L. No. 109-3, §
2. The Court has treated the question of exhaustion largely as a creature of Congress's creation.
See, e.g., Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001) (applying broad exhaustion requirement specified by Congress in the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131
(1988) (no exhaustion requirement for Section 1983 civil rights suits filed in state court); Patsy v.
Bd. of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S. 496 (1982) (same with respect to Section 1983 actions filed in
federal court).
155
Once again, Professor Engdahl reaches an opposite conclusion. See Engdahl, supra note
126, at 168-70.
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The Rooker/Feldman Doctrine

By virtue of its clear jurisdictional grant combined with its recognition
in
that there were underlying state proceedings, the Act allows a federal court to, 156
some sense, sit as an appellate tribunal concerning those state proceedings.
Without the Act, a federal district court would be prohibited from considering
such a suit under the Rooker/Feldman doctrine. That doctrine precludes "statecourt losers from complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district
court review and rejection of those judgments."' 157 The doctrine is a statutory
one based on the Court's interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 that grants appellate
jurisdiction concerning state-court judgments to the Supreme Court, not district
because the doctrine is statutory,
courts.15 8 As the Court recently recognized,
159
it.
altered
has
and
may
Congress
One reaches the same conclusion from first principles. Removing a barrier to inferior federal court review of state court cases does not compromise any
core adjudicatory function of the federal judicial branch. The federal court system maintains its institutional responsibility for its own decision - it will be
final and the court can engage in an actually effective review of the merits of the
issue. Thus, the removal of the Rooker/Feldman60limitation enhances the "judicial Power" if it has any impact on it whatsoever.
d.

De Novo Review and Res Judicata

The final potentially questionable procedural direction in the Act is
Congress's specification that a federal court evaluate any challenge "de novo"
and "notwithstanding any prior State court determination."' 161 The effect of
See Pub. L. No. 109-3, §§ 1, (2). It is more accurate to consider the federal court to occupy
156
a position similar to that of a court considering a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In this context, the court is engaged in collateral review not direct appellate review. This distinction would
not matter for purposes of the Rooker/Feldman doctrine because the effect of appellate review is
present. The collateral/direct review distinction might very well be critical in other contexts. See,
e.g., Jordan Steiker, Habeas Exceptionalism, 78 TEx. L. REv. 1703, 1708-09 (2000) (discussing
potential differences in applying separation of powers challenge to certain aspects of habeas corpus law). A serious exploration of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
157 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1521-22 (2005).
158 Id. at 1521.
159 Id. at 1526 n.8 ("Congress, if so minded, may explicitly empower district courts to oversee
certain state-court judgments and has done so, most notably, in authorizing federal habeas review
of state prisoners' petitions.").
160 To the extent such things matter, inferior federal court review of state decisions also appears
to be consistent with the original understanding of the Constitution. See THE FEDERALIST No. 82
(Alexander Hamilton) ("I perceive at present of no impediment to the establishment of an appeal
from the state courts to the subordinate national tribunals.").
161 Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 2.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol108/iss2/4

34

Terri Schiavo:
A Primer
the American
Constitution
AND
TERRIon
SCHIA
VO
2005] Allen: Congress andCONGRESS

these provisions is to both establish the standard of review the court will use and
simultaneously eliminate any res judicata bar that might have prevented the parents from pursuing relief in federal court under the Act. 162 The issue is whether
Congress's specification of a standard of review
or abrogation of res judicata is
163
a violation of separation of powers principles.
The issue of providing the appropriate standard of review for federal
court litigation can be a complicated one depending upon the particular circumstances. However, the Act represents the situation in which there is the least
difficulty. Congress specified that the federal court should exercise a "de novo"
standard of review.' 64 That standard of review provides the widest possible consideration of relevant material - both factual and legal. 165 There is no serious
argument that any core attribute of the "judicial Power" is compromised when
the court is commanded to consider all evidence and relevant legal principles. 66
162

As the Court recently reaffirmed:

Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the
parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been
raised in that action. Under collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of that issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to
the first case.
San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 2005 U.S. LEXIS
4848 at *27 (June 20, 2005) (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980)).
163 Given the focus of the Article, I do not purport to evaluate whether a party could mount a
successful argument that Congressional abrogation of res judicata was a violation of due process
or equal protection. Also, I do not address in this sub-part the impact of Congress's focus on a
single case. I deal with that issue below. See infra Part II.D.
164 Pub. L. No. 109-03, § 2.
165

See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 106 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "appeal de novo" as "[a]n

appeal in which the appellate court uses the trial court's record but reviews the evidence and law
without deference to the trial court's ruling"); cf. id. at 864 (defining "de novo judicial review" as
"[a] court's nondeferential review of an administrative decision, usu. through a review of the
administrative record plus any additional evidence the parties present").
166 Moreover, if there were a constitutional issue in specifying the use of the de novo standard
of review, numerous federal statutes would be called into question. Congress has included directions to federal courts to use reviewing de novo throughout the United States Code. See, e.g., 5
U.S.C. § 553(4)(B) (2005) (reviewing de novo certain agency decisions withholding release of
records); 7 U.S.C. § 499g(c) (2005) (reviewing de novo Secretary of Agriculture's determination
on a "reparations order"); 12 U.S.C. § 216b(e)(2) (2005) (reviewing de novo claim of ownership
of unclaimed property in federal control); 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(2) (2005) (reviewing de novo concerning certain cease and desist orders of the Federal Trade Commission); 16 U.S.C. § 3373(c)
(2005) (reviewing de novo civil penalties concerning illegally taken fish and wildlife); 18 U.S.C.
§ 923(f(3) (2005) (reviewing de novo denial or revocation of license concerning importing,
manufacturing or dealing in firearms); 19 U.S.C. § 1592(e)(1) (2005) (reviewing de novo penalties concerning the avoidance of tariff duties); 21 U.S.C. § 335a(j)(2) (2005) (reviewing de novo
certain decisions of the Secretary of Health and Human Services under the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetics Act); 22 U.S.C. § 4140(b)(2) (2005) (reviewing de novo certain grievances by
members of the foreign service); 25 U.S.C. § 314 (reviewing de novo certain disputes concerning
the Secretary of the Interior's determination of rights-of-way in Indian Territory); 26 U.S.C. §
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Such a direction enhances the court's actual effectiveness by allowing a greater
(or at least not restricting) source material from which to reason. It also makes
institutional responsibility for that decision greater by creating the opportunity
for more meaningful appellate review within Article III. Moreover, it does all
of this without having any impact on finality, the third key feature of the courts'
core adjudicatory role. Accordingly, while there may be situations in which the
specification 167of a standard of review is constitutionally problematic, this is not
one of them.
61 10(f)(4)(A) (2005) (determining de novo certain tax-related matters); 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1)
(2005) (determining de novo certain appeals from the bankruptcy court); 30 U.S.C. § 17190)
(2005) (reviewing de novo Secretary of the Interior's determination concerning certain matters
related to oil and gas royalty management); 33 U.S.C. § 1320(f) (2005) (reviewing de novo enforcement actions concerning international pollution abatement); 41 U.S.C. § 609(a)(3) (2005)
(reviewing de novo ruling concerning certain government contract disputes); 42 U.S.C. § 300e9(d)(3) (2005) (reviewing de novo the assessment of civil penalties concerning employee health
plans).
167
One area meriting further discussion in this regard is Congress's power to restrictthe range
of what a federal court may consider in its adjudicatory role. The issue is currently presented in
one form by Congressional efforts to restrict the availability of federal habeas corpus with respect
to state convictions. In 1996 Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA"). One portion of AEDPA prohibits a federal court from granting a writ of habeas
corpus to a state prisoner on a claim adjudicated in state court unless the state court process "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §
22541(d)(1) (2005). Thus, a federal court cannot look to circuit precedent as a source of relevant
authority and must show a great deal of deference to the state court adjudication. See generally
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (discussing AEDPA but declining to address any constitutional issues). In other words, AEDPA in many respects represents the converse of the situation
under the Act in which Congress instructed the federal courts to broadly review state court decisions.
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has recently instructed the
parties to a habeas proceeding to brief the question whether "ADEPA unconstitutionally prescribes the sources of law that the Judicial branch must use in exercising its jurisdiction or unconstitutionally prescribes the substantive rules of decision by which the federal courts must decide
constitutional questions that arise in state habeas cases." See Order in Irons v. Carey, 408 F.3d
1165 (9th Cir. 2005). Other circuit courts have rejected constitutional challenges to AEDPA on
such grounds. See, e.g., Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 874-75 (4th Cir. 1998), overruled on
other grounds by Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869-70
(7th Cir. 1996). Not surprisingly, these provisions of AEDPA have also spawned academic commentary. See, e.g., Ira Bloom, Prisons,Prisoners,and Pine Forests: Congress Breaches the Wall
Separating Legislative from JudicialPower, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 389, 414-23 (1998); Liebman &
Ryan, supra note 82, at 864-884; Note, Powers of Congress and the Court Regarding the Availability and Scope of Review, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1551 (2001); Scheidegger, supra note 124, at
945-60; Steiker, supra note 156, at 1724-28; Symposium, Congress and the Courts: Jurisdiction
and Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2445-2636 (1998).
On the one hand, such restrictions might be consistent with the principles I have articulated above,
if, for example, there is a constitutionally meaningful difference in collateral and direct review.
On the other hand, it might be that Congress simply does not have the power to restrict the legal or
factual materials an Article III court considers without undermining the "judicial Power." In any
event, the resolution of this issue bears watching. This is especially so because, in addition to the
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The question concerning res judicata can be similarly complex. To answer the question, one first needs to step back and review one point we have
already covered: Congress may not constitutionally order a federal court to reopen one of its final judgments.1 68 If that is a constitutional principle rooted in
Article III, one can see that power vested in Congress to abrogate res judicata
with respect to a prior federal decision that could very well raise concerns of a
constitutional magnitude. And the Court has appeared to accept the proposition
that in order to preserve the balance of power between the courts and the political branches of government, the Article III judiciary must retain a measure of
control over the application of res judicata doctrine.
The same logic does not apply when the subject of Congressional action
is a prior state court decision. In this context, there are no Article 1I concerns at
play. Instead, the central constitutional issue is Congressional power to confer
jurisdiction on the federal courts within the limitations of Article 111.170 If Congress's power to confer jurisdiction to provide protection for federal rights is to
be given meaningful effect, that body must have the power to specify the preclusive effect, if any, of prior litigation in state courts.
In addition to the power to confer jurisdiction under Article III, Congressional authority to remove res judicata bars finds support in Article IV of
the Constitution that confers on Congress the power to specify the effect of prior

pendency of Irons, there is currently pending before Congress a bill that further restrict the ability
of the federal courts to consider habeas petitions from state prisoners. See The Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088 and H.R. 3035, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cigbin/bdquery/z?d109:s.01088: (last visited August 8, 2005).
168 See supra Part II.B.
169 The Court dealt with the issue in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. 514 U.S. 211. In its attempt to sustain the statute there at issue, the government had argued that a Congressional direction to reopen dismissed claims under the federal securities laws was akin to Congress's power to
direct that res judicata not apply in certain cases. Id. at 230-32. The government relied on an
earlier Supreme Court decision that had sustained a Congressional statute directing the Court of
Claims to consider a takings claim of the Sioux Nation without regard to the Tribe's prior litigation against the United States. Id. (discussing United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371
(1980)). The Plaut Court rejected the government's argument. First, the Court made the commonsense point that Sioux Nation dealt with the waiver of the res judicata defense with respect to
the United States as a litigant. Id. More importantly for present purposes, the Court went on to
note that even if that were not the case, the essential Article III-based concerns that underlay the
Court's holding in Plaut led to the conclusion that Congress did not have unchecked power to
order relitigation of matters previously decided by Article III courts merely by suspending the
rules of res judicata. Id. at 231-32. Instead, the Court opined that the Article III judiciary needed
to maintain discretion in the matter. In the words of the Court, "[w]aiver [of the res judicata defense] subject to the control of the courts themselves would obviously raise no issue of separation
of powers .... ." Id. That holding is entirely consistent with my articulation of the "judicial
Power" because allowing Congress to regulate res judicata in the manner argued in Plaut would
undermine the finality of Article III judgments.
170 I discussed these principles in depth above. See supra Part II.A.
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litigation.'17 Congress has exercised its power under this constitutional provision by enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which "has long been understood to encompass the doctrines of res judicata ...., Thus, as far as state court judgments
are concerned, the appropriate role of res judicata is statutory, unchecked by
underlying Article III concerns that would be present with former federal litigation. As such, Congress has the power to specify by statute the impact of former
state court litigation, a direction that the federal courts are not free to ignore.173
The Act is consistent with these various principles. It legislates con174
cerning res judicata as far as the Florida state court litigation is concerned.
This is legislation the federal courts are duty-bound to honor. At the same time,
the Act does not purport to instruct the federal courts as to a waiver of res judicata principles for any prior federal court litigation. 75 In that respect, Article III
courts retain the discretion to deal with the defense, discretion the Court correctly has 76indicated is essential to the proper relationship among the federal
branches.1
The Generalized Deliberative Process

e.

Finally, one might argue that the sum of the Act's procedural parts simply intrudes too deeply on the deliberative process of the federal courts. 17 7 Such
an argument is no more sustainable than is an attack on the Act's procedural
171

U.S.

CONST.

art.

IV, §

1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each state to the public

Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State; And the Congress may by general
Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effects thereof.").
172
San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 125 S.Ct. 2491, 2500 (2005).
173 The Court recently reaffirmed this principle. Id. In San Remo Hotel, citizens argued that
the Court should adopt an exception to res judicata under Section 1738 with respect to takings
claims that, for various reasons, required prior state court proceedings. Id. at 2502. The Court
rejected the argument by noting that "[flederal courts, moreover, are not free to disregard 28
U.S.C. § 1738 simply to guarantee that all takings plaintiffs can have their day in federal court."
Id. Later in the opinion, the Court also discussed one of its earlier decisions in which it had held
that Section 1983 did not abrogate principles of res judicata. Id. at 2505 (discussing Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980)). In particular, the Court quoted McCurry's statement that "[tihere
is, in short, no reason to believe that Congress intended to provide a person claiming a federal
right an unrestricted opportunity to relitigate an issue already decided in state court . . . ." Id.
(quoting Allen, 449 U.S. at 103-04). The implication of these decisions is that had Congress intended to allow such unrestricted relitigation it would have been a federal court's duty to follow
that intention. See id.
174 See Pub. L. No. 109-03, § 2 (dictating the impact of former state court litigation).
175
Id. (providing no instruction concerning any prior federal court litigation). Once again,
none of the parties and no court raised the possible implication of Ms. Schiavo's parents' prior
federal lawsuits.
176
See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 230-32 (1995).
This is the tone of much of Judge Birch's constitutional argument. See, e.g., Schiavo ex rel.
177
Schindler v. Schiavo, 404 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11 th Cir. 2005).
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requirements individually. First, a blanket assertion that Congress is without
power to affect the manner of a court's deliberative process is not supported by,
and in fact is contrary to, well-established law. In addition to the points made
concerning each of the procedural directions in the Act taken separately," 78 the
Supreme Court has long recognized the power of Congress to control the manner of Article Ill decisionmaking. For example, nearly 140 years ago the Court
stated that Article Im's broad grant of power to create (or not to create) inferior
federal courts carried with it the power to establish "the manner of procedure in
its exercise after it has been acquired . . ,,179 And, the Court continued, this
power 0was "remitted without check or limitation to the wisdom of the legisla18
ture."'
The modern Court makes the same point albeit with an important caveat. In 1996, Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
("PLRA"). 18 1 The statute dealt with a number of matters concerning prisoner
litigation related to conditions of confinement, including the ability of prisons to
seek relief from consent decrees or other types of existing equitable relief.182 An
important feature of the scheme Congress developed in the area was that a
prison could seek a judicial determination whether an existing injunction should
continue given the change in substantive the PLRA represented. 83 To do so, the
prison was to file a motion with the appropriate court. If the court did not rule
on the motion within 30 days (extendable to 90 days in certain situations) the
existing injunction would be automatically stayed. 84 One aspect of the constitutional challenge to the PLRA was the assertion that "because it places a deadline on185
judicial decisionmaking, [it] thereby interfer[es] with core judicial functions."
Importantly for present purposes, the Court rejected this challenge to the
PLRA. The Court's central reason was that the "core function" of the judiciary
was "to decide 'cases and controversies properly before [it].' 86 Thus, it is fair
to say that the Court does not view the judicial branch as having a core institutional interest in the way in which it decides cases; the core departmental value
178 Each procedural direction Congress set forth in Section 2 of the Act was considered separately above. See supra Part II.C. 1.
179 Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. 247, 251-52 (1867).
180 Id. at 252.
181 18 U.S.C. §3626 (a)-(g) (2005); 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77.
182
Id.
183
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)
184
18 U.S.C. § 3 626(e)(2).
185 Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 349 (2000). In addition to rejecting this challenge, the
Court also rejected an argument that the PLRA unconstitutionally reversed an Article III judgment. The Court concluded that Congress had amended existing law dealing with a prospective,
continuing injunction, which was entirely proper. Id. at 336-44.
186
Miller, 530 U.S. at 349-50 (quoting United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20 (1960)).
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is in actually deciding those matters within its jurisdiction.187 That is not to say
the courts have no power concerning the timing of their decision. In the absence
of an applicable Congressional rule, they have the power to regulate in this ancillary area. But once Congress speaks, the courts defer. In my terminology, it
is an ancillary function.
The modem Court, compared to its Nineteenth Century precursor, has
intimated that there is some limit on Congressional action. The Court in Miller
v. French reserved the question whether Congress could go too far in mandating the manner of judicial decisionmaking. 188 This caveat is important because
without it the balance of power between the branches could be skewed too much
in favor of Congress. However, it does not render the Act unconstitutional. In
their totality, Congress's procedural prescriptions in no way restrict the information a federal court may consider. Indeed, Congress's directions confirm broad
power in the courts to consider a wide array of information as part of what the
Supreme Court has termed the Article I1"adjudicatory role."'' 89 Thus, while
there would unquestionably be a point at which Congress, under the guise of
mandating a "procedure," could intrude on the core judicial function of adjudication, that threshold is not implicated in terms of the Act.
In sum, if a core function of the federal judiciary included exclusive
control over the manner of decisionmaking, the judicial branch would wield
enormous power. First, the courts would continue to have the strong power of
judicial review most often associated with Marbury v. Madison.'90 Second,
Congress would continue to be precluded from directing (1) a substantive result
in a case (at least without amending applicable law) 191 or (2) the reopening of
final judgments of Article III courts. 92 But in this new world Congress would
also be without power to specify the manner in which the courts decide cases,
including setting a standard of review and presumably other types of procedural
rules. 193 While Congress would retain significant authority under Article I
187

See also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995) (noting that the fed-

eral judiciary has the power "not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them") (emphasis in original).
188
Miller, 530 U.S. at 350 ("In this action, we have no occasion to decide whether there could
be a time constraint on judicial action that was so severe that it implicated these structural separation of powers concerns."). For a general discussion of this issue, see William F. Ryan, Rush to
Judgment: A ConstitutionalAnalysis of Time Limits on Judicial Decisions, 77 B.U. L.REV. 761
(1997).
189

Miller, 530 U.S. at 350.

190

5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).

See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 128, 146 (1872).
See Plaut,514 U.S. at 218-19.
193 Yet another implication of a narrow view of Congressional power over procedure would be
191
192

the ability of Congress to control aspects of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. There has already been debate about the wisdom, and even the authority, of Congressional involvement in this
area. See generally Engdahl, supra note 126, at 172-74; Linda S. Mullenix, JudicialPower and
the Rules EnablingAct, 46 MERCER L. REV 733 (1995); JudicialIndependence, supra note 82, at
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with respect to the judiciary, 194 there is no denying that adoption of this view
would yield an important increase in power for the judicial branch and disrupt
the balance of the federal government's coordinate parts.
D.

The Singular Focus of the Act

Even if everything discussed up to this point is taken as established,
there remains a final question: Consistent with separation of powers principles,
may Congress legislate with reference to a single case as it did in the Act? This
sub-part addresses the serious structural constitutional issues implicated by the
Act's singular focus on Terri Schiavo and her family.
There is nothing per se unconstitutional about Congress legislating with
respect to a single individual. 95 As the Court recognized, "[w]hile legislatures
usually act through laws of general applicability, that is by no means their only
legitimate mode of action."'' 96 The Constitution most certainly limits certain
97
types of individualized lawmaking, but it does not ban the general practice. 1
In the same way that Congress may go too far in individualized lawmaking and thus violate some individual right, it can also violate separation of
powers principles by such action. It is not so much that Congress is intruding
on a core judicial function, the argument at the heart of much of the criticism
directed against the Act and that was addressed at length in early Parts of this
Article. 98 Rather, the concern is that Congress is acting in a fundamentally
non-legislative manner by engaging in this specific type of individualized lawmaking. To simplify matters somewhat, the argument is that Congress acted as
a court when it passed the Act. 99

724-25. Such continued debate is somewhat perplexing given the Supreme Court's clear approval
of such Congressional action. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1965).
194 For example, Congress would retain the power to confer subject matter jurisdiction and
even abolish the federal courts (at least under the plain language of U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 1).
195
See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 239 n.9 ("The premise that there is something wrong with particularized legislative action is of course questionable.").
1%96

Id.

197 For example, the Constitution expressly prohibits bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, ci. 3. In addition, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, includ-

ing its equal protection component, can serve to check certain instances of individualized lawmaking. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
198 See, e.g., supra Part II.C.
199
An example of what may be seen as Congress acting inappropriately as a court is I.N.S. v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1982). In Chadha, the Supreme Court held that the "legislative veto" was
unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the Constitution's mandate that all laws be presented to the President of the United States. Id. at 956-58. Justice Powell agreed that the legislative veto was unconstitutional, but he based his conclusion on substantially different grounds than
did the majority. Id. at 965-66. For Justice Powell, the constitutional defect was that Congress
had assumed what amounted to a judicial function in the particular situation before the Court. Id.
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There is no question that it would seriously undermine the foundation of
separation of powers if Congress were allowed to assume the powers of a court
under the cloak of its Article I authority. The difficult task becomes drawing the
line that separates legitimate, though individualized, lawmaking from illegitimate legislative judging. Placing the line incorrectly in either direction will
upset the delicate balance of power on which the constitutional order is built in
the United States.
Terri Schiavo's situation is actually an easy one in terms of marking the
boundary between the legislative and judicial powers. While Congress acted
only with respect to her, it did so in a manner entirely consistent with its legislative role. It used its powers under Articles I and III to allow for litigation of a
claim on Ms. Schiavo's behalf, but it did not directly, or by necessary implication, dictate or preordain how any such claim would be resolved. 200 It was the
judicial branch that was to do the work of resolving that claim. Congress set the
rules and the judiciary served as the umpire.
Indeed, Congress's actions concerning Terri Schiavo pale in comparison
to legislation the Court has upheld as consistent with separation of powers principles. In the late 1980s, litigation began in federal courts in the United States
District Courts for the Western District of Washington and for the District of
Oregon concerning the federal government's regulation of timber sales from
old-growth forests in the northwestern part of the United States. 20 ' An issue in
these cases was whether certain agencies had given adequate consideration to
the potentially adverse impact of logging on the Northern Spotted Owl. 202 During the pendency of this litigation, Congress passed legislation containing the
following provision:
Congress hereby determines and directs that management of...
[lands at issue in certain environmental statutes] ... on the thir-

teen national forests in Oregon and Washington and Bureau of
Land Management in western Oregon known to contain northern spotted owls is adequate consideration for the purpose of
meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis for the
consolidated cases [pending in the two district courts].20 3
Relying on United States v. Klein, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit struck down the Congressional action on the ground that
Congress had inappropriately directed an outcome in a pending case without
altering the substantive law. 20 4 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the
200
201

See supra Part I (discussing the structure and operation of the Act).
See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1992).

202

Id.

203

Id. at 434-35.

204

Id. at 436 (citing 914 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1990)).
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Ninth Circuit holding that Congress had amended substantive law, even if it had
done so for only a single set of cases. 20 5 As such, the Court reasoned that Congress acted legislatively and the courts were required to apply the "new" law
Congress had put into place. 2°6 If the Robertson Court was not persuaded of a
separation of powers violation in that case, it strikes me as highly unlikely that
there would be a violation in terms of the Act. 207 Simply put, in Robertson
Congressional action decided a case while in Schiavo the law merely provided a
forum for federal courts to engage in their usually activities.
1I.

LESSONS TO BE DRAWN FROM CONGRESS AND TERRI SCHIAVO

Consideration of Congressional intervention concerning Terri Schiavo
and the response of the federal courts yields interesting insights into the power
structures established under the Constitution. Indeed, it might be said that a
benefit of Congress's action, sordid though it may have been, is the opportunity
to reconsider some of the fundamental principles underlying the nature of
American government. Many of these points were discussed in the context of
rejecting specific challenges to the Act. This Part collects and discusses these
issues, divided into four "lessons."
A.

Article III Reflects a Broad Grant of Authority to the FederalGovernment to "Intrude on" State Sovereignty

The first lesson to be drawn from Congressional involvement in the
Terri Schiavo matter is that Article Il of the Constitution is more than a blueprint for the role of the federal judiciary, in other words something concerning
the separation of powers. That Article is also a dramatic example of the extent
of latent federal power over state affairs, a federalism concept. In Section 2 of
Article III, the Framers simultaneously capped the extent to which Congress
could authorize the federal courts to "intrude" on state matters while simultaneously defining the significant extent to which such intrusion was permitted.
Thus, those who argue for a broad conception of state sovereignty somehow
implicit in the constitutional fabric will need to deal with the explicit power
205
206

Robertson, 503 U.S. at 437-41.
Id. Professor Noah has recently discussed a similar situation, this one concerning Congres-

sional legislation apparently focused on a single child custody dispute pending in the local courts
of the District of Columbia. See Noah, supra note 13, at 122-23 (discussing Congressional legislation concerning Dr. Elizabeth Morgan).
207
Robertson, 503 U.S. at 437-41. The Court did not rule on an issue it deemed to have been
waived in the case, namely whether "a change in law, prospectively applied, would be unconstitutional if the change swept no more broadly, or little more broadly, than the range of applications
in pending cases." Id. at 441. I think there is much to be said for the argument that what Congress did in Robertson was on the judicial side of the divide. I discuss this issue below when
considering lessons that might be taken from Congressional involvement in the Terri Schiavo
affair. See infra Part III.C.
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allocating devices in Article III. Recognition of this function of Article I1m
opens 8a range of possibilities for federal action. I discuss these matters be20
low.
B.

Article III Also Reflects Broad CongressionalPower over the Federal
Courts

The second "lesson" is that the Constitution grants Congress broad
powers with respect to the federal court system. 209 First, within the confines of
Article III's definition of the "judicial Power of the United States," Congress
has textually unrestricted authority to confer jurisdiction on the inferior federal
courts. 210 That power can be used in a gross fashion such as the general grant of
federal question jurisdiction.2 1 It can also be exercised in more targeted ways
such as the recently enacted "Multiparty, multiforum jurisdiction" statute dealing with an accident in which at least 75 people are killed and in which there is
212
And
diversity of citizenship between at least one plaintiff and one defendant.
it can be used in the laser-like manner illustrated by the Act.
This power to regulate jurisdiction is a critical one in the American constitutional order. As mentioned above, that authority is part of the allocation of
governmental authority between the federal and state systems. 2 It is also an
important part of the separation of powers at the federal level. It allows Congress to articulate the contours of the cases and controversies that will be heard
in the federal courts. Given the power inherent in judicial review, such a check

See infra Part III.D.
Of course, those powers are not unrestricted, but I deal with those restrictions separately See
infra Part III.B. One can divide Congress's power vis-A-vis the federal courts into several types. I
focus on the two matters directly implicated in the Schiavo case, although I also mention several
others briefly at the end of this sub-part.
210
I do not address here the related questions involving Congress's ability to restrict the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts once given. As a general matter, however, it seems that the
same logic underlying broad Congressional authority to grant jurisdiction would also support
broad power to restrict it. I leave that debate for another day. I also do not address here the distinct issues raised by Congressional attempts to restrict the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
211 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2005) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.").
212 28 U.S.C. § 1369 (2005). There are additional restrictions on the jurisdiction conferred
under this statute further narrowing the jurisdictional window Congress opened. See, e.g., 28
U.S.C. § 1369(b) (2005) (setting forth situations in which the district courts should not hear
cases). There are also other examples of such targeted use of jurisdiction including the Class
Action Fairness Act, discussed below, infra Part III.D., and the Air Transportation Safety and
System Stabilization Act, which, among other things, consolidated all litigation arising out of the
September 11th terrorist attacks in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York. See Public Law 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified as amended in 49 U.S.C. §
4101).
208

209

213

See supra Part III.A.
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on the front end - that is controlling the cases that get into the system in the first
place - helps keep the entire system in balance.
A second example of Congressional authority concerning the federal
courts is the power to control the procedures under which the judiciary operates.
There is no doubt that there is a core judicial function into which Congress may
not constitutionally intrude.214 Stated simply, that function is to "decide"
cases,2 15although as I have described above, this concept is better thought of as
containing three distinct attributes: actual effectiveness; finality; and institutional responsibility.2 6 But the core judicial function does not extend to the
manner in which the federal courts decide cases. So long as Congress does not
legislate in such a way as to impede the judiciary's core adjudicatory function, it
may prescribe the rules by which a court is to operate. 217
One can see the power in the control of procedure clearly under the Act.
Congress removed a number of procedural impediments that could have precluded Ms. Schiavo's parents from proceeding with their claims. 218 The effect
of Congressional action was to clear a path for the federal courts to perform
their adjudicatory role and to provide a broader array of factual material for the
courts to consider in that role.219 Congress did not impede the judicial function,
but it was able to set the stage on which it was to be performed. Again, such
coordination among the branches is a key ingredient in the American system of
governmental checks and balances.
Finally, there are other substantial means by which Congress maintains
a check on the judicial branch that bear mention even though none is directly
implicated in the Schiavo matter. First, Congress retains the power, within Arti214
215
216

I discuss this point in more detail below. See infra Part III.C.
See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995).
See supra Part I.C. (laying out conception of the meaning of the "judicial Power of the

United States").
217
Such an impediment, for example, could be the specification of a time in which a decision is
to be made that is inconsistent with the ability to decide a case under the "actual effectiveness"
criterion. Cf. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 349-50 (2000) (rejecting a challenge to a rule requiring a decision within 30 days but leaving open whether there could be a shorter time that would
impair the core judicial function). Another example might be a procedural rule the effect of which
is to either mandate the meaning of evidence, cf United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 128,
143-44 (1872) (discussing Congressional specification of meaning to be accorded a presidential
pardon), or to restrict the ability of the court to consider certain evidence. The Act suffers from
none of these infirmities. See supra Part II.C. (discussing procedural issues under the Act).
218
See Pub. L No. 109-3, § 2. See also supra Part II (discussing structure of the Act).
219
Perhaps the real power of procedural control, and where most of the inter-branch disputes
will occur, is a situation in which Congress attempts to limit the materials the courts may consider
or otherwise procedurally restricts a court's deliberations. One such example is the disputed provisions of the "Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act" ("AEDPA"). See supra note 167.
While the issue is more complicated, the manner in which to evaluate these procedural directives
remains the same as that employed when analyzing the Act. One should consider whether the
requirements - in isolation or in total - impede the three features comprising the core adjudicatory
function of the "judicial Power of the United States."
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cle I limits, to amend the substantive law and, thereby, affect the outcome of a
pending matter before final judgment. 220 Second, and related, Congress may
alter the substantive law in such a way as to make the continued enforcement of
equitable relief unwarranted. 22 Both of these points at their heart go to the ability of Congress to exercise its lawmaking function to its full extent up to the
point at which doing so would undermine the coordinate core judicial role.
C.

CongressionalPower Over Federal Courts is Not Without Limits

The concern with maintaining a balance of power in the constitutional
structure also means that the authority of Congress over the federal courts has
limits. These boundaries come in two generic varieties. First, there are direct
structural restrictions on what Congress may do when exercising its powers
concerning the judiciary.222 In this category fall several of the constitutional
challenges to the Act discussed, but ultimately rejected, in Part II of this Article.
Some of these restrictions are well-established. For example, Congress may not
direct the outcome in a pending case without amending applicable law; 223 it may
not direct the reopening of the final judgments of Article III courts; 224 and it
may not place review of Article III judgments in non-Article III entities. 225
There are also additional structural limitations that I believe should be
recognized. One such limitation concerns the issue the Court avoided in
Robertson. There, the Court declined to consider whether Congress exceeds its
powers when it amends substantive law in such a way that the change affects
only a single - or perhaps a hand full - of pending cases.226 There is a powerful
structural reason to adopt a rule prohibiting Congress from legislating in such a
way, at least with respect to lawsuits focused on past activity. Fundamentally,
allowing Congress to direct the outcome in a single case through such a targeted
change in the law would place Congress in what amounts to an adjudicatory role
in all but name.227 The lines between the branches would, accordingly, be
220

See, e.g., Plaut, 514 U.S. at 226-27; Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429,

438-41 (1992).
221
See, e.g., Miller, 530 U.S. at 347-48; Pennsylvania v. The Wheeling and Belmont Bridge
Co., 59 U.S. 421, 431-33 (1856) (Act of Congress declaring a bridge built by defendants was
lawful in its present position and elevation upheld as constitutional exercise of Congressional
authority).
222
Congress is also limited by the more generic structural requirement that it must have the
power to legislate in the first place. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
5.
223
See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218.
224
Id. at 218-19.
225
Id. at 218.
226
See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992).
227
Professor Gary Lawson has raised, but not discussed in depth, a similar issue. See Lawson,
supra note 124, at 207-10.
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blurred to the detriment of the balance of power at the heart of the federal government. Such focused Congressional action appears rare. Time will tell how
the Court views the matter should it arise again.228
A second type of limitation on Congress's power is an indirect one
flowing from the various protections of individual liberty under the Constitution. To be sure, the principal focus of the protections of individual rights is on
the safeguarding of the People's liberty and not on the preservation of the appropriate governmental structure. 229 Nevertheless, a by-product of such protections is an additional check on Congressional transgressions of the separation of
powers. So, for example, the fact that due process and equal protection principles might preclude certain Congressional legislation aimed at a single individual would not only protect that individual's personal rights but also buttress the
demarcation between the legislative and judicial functions.
In the end, none of the limitations on Congress's powers were implicated by the Terri Schiavo legislation.230 Recognition of those limitations, however, is a reminder of the intricate interrelation of the branches.
D.

The System the FramersEstablishedProvides Congress with Amazingly
Subtle Ways in which to Legislate

Under Article I of the Constitution, Congress is given a wide variety of
powers that it may utilize to enact substantive legislation.23 1 Acting under these
provisions Congress can have a powerful impact on American life. But an important lesson to be drawn from the interaction of Terri Schiavo and Congress is
that Congressional power under the Constitution can be wielded in ways far
more subtle that Article I, Section 8 lawmaking. In this particular case, for example, Congress was able to combine its powers to confer subject matter jurisdiction and specify court procedures to provide a forum for federal review of
228

Other commentators have been critical of Robertson and the Court's unwillingness to ad-

dress the issue of Congressional action designed to dictate the result in a single case. See, e.g.,
Bloom, supra note 167, at 395-98; Amy D. Ronner, Judicial Self-Demise: The Test of When
Congress Impermissibly Intrudes on Judicial Power after Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society
and the FederalAppellate Courts' Rejection of the Separation of Powers Challenges to the New
Section of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934, 35 ARIz. L. REv. 1037, 1053-54 (1993).
229
See, e.g., Robertson, 503 U.S. at 350 ("In contrast to due process, which principally serves
to protect the personal rights of litigants to a full and fair hearing, separation of powers principles
are primarily addressed to the structural concerns of protecting the role of the independent Judiciary within the constitutional design.").
230
See supra Part II (discussing and rejecting various structural constitutional challenges to the
Act).
231
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. There are important additional avenues for substantive lawmaking such as Congressional power to enact "appropriate legislation" under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. While these fonts of legislative authority
are different in certain respects, the distinctions I draw here between enacting substantive legislation on the one hand and providing for federal jurisdiction or specific rules for adjudication on the
other are no different.
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federal rights. All of this was done without the invocation of any substantive
Article I legislative power. 32
There are also other illustrations of such subtle Congressional actions.
To take just one recent example, consider the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
enacted into law in February 2005.233 While the specifics of this legislation are
complex and subject to interpretation, its basic thrust is to provide federal jurisdiction over, and a means of removal of, certain class actions in which only
minimal diversity of citizenship is present.2 34 Congress did not enact substantive legislation concerning the subject of class actions. Rather, it sought to
achieve its objectives, dealing with purported class action "abuses '2 35 by using
its jurisdictional powers, apparently with the desire that doing so would have an
impact on the substantive outcome of this class of litigation. The jury remains
out as to whether Congress will be successful in addressing class action
"abuses" in this manner, but the means it chose to deal with the perceived issue
are similar in fundamental respects to the procedure employed concerning Terri
Schiavo.
The potential implications of this more subtle form of lawmaking are
immense. For example, Congress could decide that there is a class of litigation
about which it is suspicious for either legitimate policy reasons or crass political
ones. Medical malpractice claims might be in this category. One option concerning these claims would be to attempt to enact substantive legislation under
its Article I powers, perhaps based on Congressional power "[t]o regulate
Commerce . . .among the several States. 236 But such substantive legislation
could face serious hurdles including challenges to the scope of Congressional
power or political opposition to "federalizing" state tort law. Facing such potential obstacles, Congress might decide that it was better to create federal jurisdiction in at least a portion of these cases with the belief that a perceived conservative federal judiciary would be more favorable to Congress's desired substantive
outcome. 237 Such a course would not be the most direct route to reach the de232

Cf Pub. L. No. 109-3, § 5 ("Nothing in this Act shall be construed to create substantive

rights not otherwise secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States or of the several
States."). To be sure, Congress did use its Article I powers to legislate here through the "Necessary and Proper Clause." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 19 ("The Congress shall have Power...
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof."). See also supra note 145 (discussing this Clause).
However, that Clause is merely an implementation device by which Congress is able to effectuate
some other power. See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
233
See Pub. L. No. 109-02.
234
See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 109-02, §§ 4-5.
235
See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 109-02, § 2(a)(2).
236
U.S. CONST.art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
237 For example, Congress could provide for only minimal diversity of citizenship among the
parties or do away with the amount in controversy applicable in diversity cases. Alternatively,
Congress might be able to allow for the removal of medical malpractice cases that "substantially
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sired Congressional238result, but it might be deemed most expedient in a given
political landscape.
Similarly, one could imagine that Congress could enact a broader regime of collateral review of federal rights that had been adjudicated in state
court. So, for example, Congress could expand the basic idea of habeas corpus
to consider matters such as civil rights litigation in state court or even state
awards of punitive damages. 239 A full articulation of this concept (including its
desirability) is beyond the scope of this paper, but the discussion thus far supports the general outlines of Congressional power to enact such a regime.2 4 °
My point here is not necessarily to encourage Congress to legislate in
any of these ways. Rather, I wish to highlight the point that the Act reflects a
type of often overlooked method of looking at Congressional power; it is a reflection of the subtlety of our Constitution.
IV. SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Congressional involvement in the tragic story of Theresa Marie Schiavo
provides fodder for much discussion. This Article has focused on only one aspect of the Congressional/Schiavo interaction, the power of Congress to legislate as it did within structural constitutional bounds. Despite the loud criticism
to the contrary, the Act is a well-crafted example of Congress using its constitutional powers in a subtle, yet powerful way. An analysis of the various constitutional objections to the Act not only demonstrates that those objections are unfounded but also serves to underscore some important lessons about the American constitutional order.
But there is also an important cautionary lesson to be taken from the
Schiavo episode. The American constitutional system is robust. If one were
limited to the design of that system on paper, there would be little cause for
affect interstate commerce." A complete discussion of this suggestion is not my purpose. I
merely wish to sketch the possibilities.
238 Federal courts would be required to apply state law under the Erie doctrine. See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). However, federal procedural rules would govern.
See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
239
The Court has indicated that such awards now raise federal due process concerns. See, e.g.,
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (reversing judgment of the
Supreme Court of Utah that upheld the jury's award of $ 145 million as punitive damages); BMW
of North American, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (holding that petitioner, distributor's, conduct was not particularly reprehensible and reversing the lower court's denial of a motion to set
aside the $ 2 million punitive damages award).
240
Yet another approach can be seen in the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act pending in the
United States House of Representatives. See H.R. 420, 109th Cong. (2005) available at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/D?c109:2./ temp/-cl09vlY5sC:: (last visited July 28, 2005).
This proposed legislation would amend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 to make it easier to
impose sanctions on the filing of "frivolous" lawsuits in federal courts. H.R. 420 § 2. It would
also make the rule applicable to cases substantially affecting interstate commerce that are pending
in state courts. H.R. 420 § 3.
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concern. In reality, however, that system is also quite delicate. In order for the
elaborate system of checks and balances to work, we must ultimately rely on the
women and men who actually serve as part of the government, including as federal judges.241
The Schiavo situation provides a prime example of the system's fragility. The Act Congress passed was carefully drafted to avoid constitutional infirmity while exercising Congressional power to near its fullest. Congress was
cautious about not directing the courts to rule in a specific way even while conferring jurisdiction and removing a number of procedural hurdles to substantive
consideration of any claim. 242 But the public rhetoric of Congressional leaders
did not match the careful contours of the Act.243 The pressure on the federal
judges hearing the case must have been enormous.
In order for the system to work - which it did - those individual federal
judges needed to have the courage to stand-up to Congressional pressure apparently designed to violate the separation of powers in deed if not word. In this
case, the country was lucky to have dedicated people such as United States District Court Judge James Whittemore who were willing to play their part in enforcing the rule of law even at the risk of personal sacrifice. 2 " Thus, while the
system the Framers established over two centuries ago provides the mechanism
for balancing the powers of the branches, it ultimately comes down to the people in government to ensure that the Framers' vision endures. That is a lesson
worth taking to heart as much as the more academic insights into the structure of
the Constitution itself.
APPENDIX
Public Law 109-3
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,

241

It is of course true that there are strong institutional safeguards meant to ensure the inde-

pendence of the judiciary. These safeguards include life-tenure and salary protection. See U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1. The Framers recognized those protections as an integral part of the constitutional system. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing life tenure),
No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing salary protection). But institutional safeguards go only
so far. One still must rely on the people who bring Article III's judicial department to life.
242
See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 109-3, §§ 1-2.
243
See supra note 50 (discussing critical Congressional commentary concerning actions taken
by the federal courts).
244
See Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F.Supp. 2d 1378, 1388 (M.D. Fla. 2005)
("This court appreciates the gravity of the consequences of denying injunctive relief. Even under
these difficult and time strained circumstances, however, and notwithstanding Congress' expressed interest in the welfare of Theresa Schiavo, this court is constrained to apply the rule of
law.").
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SECTION 1. RELIEF OF THE PARENTS OF THERESA
MARIE SCHIAVO.
The United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida shall have jurisdiction to hear, determine, and render judgment on a suit or claim by or on behalf of Theresa
Marie Schiavo for the alleged violation of any right of
Theresa Marie Schiavo under the Constitution or laws of
the United States relating to the withholding or withdrawal
of food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary to sustain
her life.
SEC. 2. PROCEDURE.
Any parent of Theresa Marie Schiavo shall have standing to
bring a suit under this Act. The suit may be brought against
any other person who was a party to State court proceedings
relating to the withholding or withdrawal of food, fluids, or
medical treatment necessary to sustain the life of Theresa
Marie Schiavo, or who may act pursuant to a State court order authorizing or directing the withholding or withdrawal
of food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary to sustain
her life. In such a suit, the District Court shall determine de
novo any claim of a violation of any right of Theresa Marie
Schiavo within the scope of this Act, notwithstanding any
prior State court determination and regardless of whether
such a claim has previously been raised, considered, or decided in State court proceedings. The District Court shall
entertain and determine the suit without any delay or abstention in favor of State court proceedings, and regardless
of whether remedies available in the State courts have been
exhausted.
SEC. 3. RELIEF.
After a determination of the merits of a suit brought under
this Act, the District Court shall issue such declaratory and
injunctive relief as may be necessary to protect the rights of
Theresa Marie Schiavo under the Constitution and laws of
the United States relating to the withholding or withdrawal
of food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary to sustain
her life.
SEC. 4. TIME FOR FILING.
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Notwithstanding any other time limitation, any suit or claim
under this Act shall be timely if filed within 30 days after
the date of enactment of this Act.
SEC. 5. NO CHANGE OF SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to create substantive
rights not otherwise secured by the Constitution and laws of
the United States or of the several States.
SEC. 6. NO EFFECT ON ASSISTING SUICIDE.
Nothing in this act shall be construed to confer additional
jurisdiction on any court to consider any claim related-(1) to assisting suicide, or
(2) a State law regarding assisting suicide.
SEC. 7. NO PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE LEGISLATION.
Nothing in this Act shall constitute a precedent with respect
to future legislation, including the provision of private relief
bills.
SEC. 8.
NO EFFECT ON THE PATIENT SELFDETERMINATION ACT OF 1990.
Nothing in this Act shall affect the rights of any person under the Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990.
SEC. 9. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.
It is the Sense of the Congress that the 109th Congress
should consider policies regarding the status and legal
rights of incapacitated individuals who are incapable of
making decisions concerning the provision, withholding, or
withdrawal of foods, fluid, or medical care.
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